Thomistic Multiple Incarnations

Pawl, Timothy

doi:10.1111/heyj.12230

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…20 For instance, Crisp (2009) addresses such topics as the election of Christ, whether an account of the logos asarkos can be had and whether it would be possible for the second person of the Trinity to become incarnate multiple times. This latter question has also been pursued by Brian Hebblethwaite (2001,2008)-answering in the negative-as well as, notably, Kevern (2002), Crisp (2009), LePoidevin (2009a, 2009b), and Pawl (2016b, 2016c. Crisp has also weighed in on how to conceive of Christ's relation to sin, especially whether Christ had a fallen human nature (Crisp, 2007) and whether Christ was sinless or impeccable (Crisp, 2009).…”

Section: Other Christological Locimentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent developments in analytic Christology

Arcadi

2018

Philosophy Compass

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The notion that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures has been the venue of much philosophical theological work in the past 40 years. One mode of engagement with this idea has been to defend the coherence of the idea. This has been done by, for example, revising standard conceptions of divinity and humanity or predicate attribution. Another mode of engagement with the doctrine is to offer models for how the state of affairs of the Incarnation might work. This could involve retrieving models from thinkers of the past. Finally, the constructive mode applies the reasoning of the two natures/one person conception to other areas of Christian theology such as the atonement or the Eucharist. Examples of each of these modes from the contemporary analytic literature are presented.

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Section: Other Christological Locimentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent developments in analytic Christology

Arcadi

2018

Philosophy Compass

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“…7 Perhaps he can't do this all within the same world, but (1) asserts that there distinct worlds wherein such concrete human natures are assumed. For more discussion on multiple incarnations from the Thomistic perspective, see Pawl (2014). 8 Tanner (1990, 117), cited in Pawl (2016).…”

Section: Premise (1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hylemorphic Animalism and the Incarnational Problem of Identity

Jaeger

2017

JAT

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In this paper, I argue that adherents of Patrick Toner’s (2011b) hylemorphic animalism who also assent to orthodox Christology and a thesis about the necessity of identity must reject a prima facie plausible theological possibility held by Ockham, entertained in one form by St. Thomas Aquinas, and recently held by Richard Cross (1989), Thomas Flint (2001a), (2001b), and (2011), and Timothy Pawl (2016) and (forthcoming) concerning which individual concrete human natures an omnipotent God could assume (viz. any of them).

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“…Something can be both passible and impassible. 20 To see this view worked out in much more logical detail, see Pawl (2014a).…”

Section: Co N C I L I a R C H R I S To Lo G Y A N D T H E P Ro B L E mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Section III I discuss three ways to deny Premise 3 of the forthcoming ar- I develop this third way in far more detail in my "A Solution to the Fundamental Philosophical Problem of Christology" (Pawl 2014a).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications

Pawl

2015

SetF

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In this article I canvas the options available to a proponent of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation against a charge of incoherence. In particular, I consider the charge of incoherence due to incompatible predications both being true of the same one person, the God-man Jesus Christ. For instance, one might think that anything divine has to have certain attributes-perhaps omnipotence, or impassibility. But, the charge continues, nothing human can be omnipotent or impassible. And so nothing can be divine and human. So Christ is not both God and man, contrary to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. To do so, first, in Section II, I will present the problem as a deductively valid argument. I then, in that section, go on to show that the proponent of traditional Christology should grant all but one premise of the argument. In the remaining sections I will canvas possible solutions to the problem. In Section III I discuss three ways to deny Premise 3 of the forthcoming argument. These ways include a Kenotic response, qua-modification (in four versions), and finally a response that accepts the compatibility of the allegedly incompatible predicates.

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Thomistic Multiple Incarnations

Cited by 8 publications

References 23 publications

Recent developments in analytic Christology

Recent developments in analytic Christology

Hylemorphic Animalism and the Incarnational Problem of Identity

Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications

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