Threat Power in Sequential Games

Brams, Steven J.; Hessel, Marek P.

doi:10.2307/2600396

Cited by 44 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…For example, Morrow (2005) assumes two players (an initiator, and a target); in order for the threat to be credible in this game, the target must believe that the initiator might prefer war to the status quo if the target does not comply with the initiator's request. Brams and Hessel (1984) assume that a threatener builds up its own reputation by keeping its threats credible. Schelling (1966) presents some historical evidence to support the assumption that some threats can be credible when the threatener has the capacity to retaliate.…”

Section: Extended Model With Retaliation Optionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

Bier

Haphuriwat

2009

Ann Oper Res

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In this paper, we investigate how many containers would need to be screened in order to deter attackers from attempting to smuggle weapons into a defending country in container freight. We hypothesize that with a sufficiently high probability of being detected, attackers might be deterred from smuggling attempts. Thus, our goal is to identify the optimal proportion of containers to inspect in order to minimize the defender's expected loss, using game theory to reflect the fact that attackers are simultaneously trying to maximize their expected rewards. Moreover, our model recognizes that the container-screening policy must simultaneously protect against different types of threats (such as nuclear bombs, dirty bombs, and assault rifles). Finally, our model also suggests that threatening to retaliate against attacks may be beneficial to defenders, as long as the threat is credible.

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Section: Extended Model With Retaliation Optionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

Bier

Haphuriwat

2009

Ann Oper Res

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“…xv With repeated interaction, costly threats that develop a reputation can be rational. Brams and Hessel (1984) explore the implications of strategic threats with repeated interaction and prior communication. xviBrams (1994, 140-54) also includes this material.…”

Section: Analysis Of the 1994 Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The prominence of two players (Castro's regime and the Clinton Administration) and the sparse interactions between the two make the crisis particularly amenable to modeling. Threat power analysis in the theory of moves (TOM) by Brams and Hessel (1984) and Brams (1994) is well suited to the problem. It makes minimal demands on the information available to researchers (i.e., ordinal rankings of possible outcomes) and has also given insights into strategic interaction in other refugee crises (Zeager and Bascom 1996;Zeager 2002;Williams and Zeager 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises

Zeager

2005

International Interactions

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The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba and the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made by the players. After the countries implemented deterrent threats, they agreed that Cuba would patrol its borders and the UnitedStates would admit 20,000 Cubans each year. We show that the analysis, suitably adapted, also illuminates strategic choices in the 1965 and 1980 Cuban refugee crises.

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“…This paradox, however, depends upon static rules of play that preclude the moves and countermoves permitted by rules 2-4 or II-IV. 7 For a different argument for eliminating (2, 2) in Prisoners' Dilemma, see Brains (1982b). 8 An outcome is a Nash equilibrium in a nonsequential game (without moves and countermoves from the initial outcome being possible) ff neither player, by departing unilaterally, can improve the outcome for himself.…”

Section: New York University Fordham Universitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Staying power in sequential games

Brams

Hessel

1983

Theor Decis

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Staying power is the ability of a player to hold off choosing a strategy in a two-person game until the other player has selected his, after which the players are assumed to be able to move and countermove sequentially to ensure their best possible outcomes before the process cycles back to the initial outcome and then repeats itself ('rational termination'). These rules of sequential play induce a determinate, Paretosuperior outcome in all two-person, finite, sequential games in which the preferences of the players are strict.In 57 of the 78 distinct 2 • 2 ordinal games (73 percent), it makes no difference who the (second-moving) player with staying power is, but in the other 21 games the outcome is power-dependent. In all but one of these games, staying power benefits the player who possesses it.If no player has staying power, the outcomes that result from sequential play and rational termination are called terminal; they coincide with staying power outcomes if they are Pareto-superior. Normative implications of the analysis for rationally justifying cooperation in such games as Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, and implementing Paretosuperior outcomes generally, are also discussed.

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Threat Power in Sequential Games

Cited by 44 publications

References 0 publications

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises

Staying power in sequential games

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