Threats Identification and their Solution in Inter-Basestation Dynamic Resource Sharing IEEE-802.22

Shaukat, R.; Khan, Shoab Ahmed; Ahmed, Adeel

doi:10.1109/ichit.2008.208

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The OFDM system is modulated using an -point discrete-time inverse Fourier transform IDFT , and then subsequently demodulated using an -point discrete-time Fourier transform DFT . The matrix representation of the OFDM system is given as (2) where is the received band-limited signal vector after DFT , where elements , the matrix is of size are the data symbols to be fingerprinted and transmitted, is a DFT-matrix with elements , using row index and column index , the vector is the sampled channel impulse response, where each element is defined as , and is the frequency-domain representation of complex Gaussian noise.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprinting Overlays Using Subspace Embedding

Goergen

Lin

Liu

et al. 2011

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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Abstract-We present a physical-layer fingerprint-embedding scheme for orthogonal frequency-division-multiplexing (OFDM) transmissions, where the fingerprint signal conveys a low capacity communication suitable for authenticating the transmission and further facilitating secure communications. Our system strives to embed the fingerprint message into the noise subspace of the channel estimates obtained by the receiver, using a number of signal spreading techniques. When side information of the channel state is known and leveraged by the transmitter, the performance of the fingerprint embedding can be improved. When channel state information is not known, blind spreading techniques are applied. The fingerprint message is only visible to aware receivers who explicitly preform detection of the signal, but is invisible to receivers employing typical channel equalization. A taxonomy of overlay designs is discussed and these designs are explored through experiment using time-varying channel-state information (CSI) recorded from IEEE802.16e Mobile WiMax base stations. The performance of the fingerprint signal as received by a WiMax subscriber is demonstrated using CSI measurements derived from the downlink signal. Detection performance for the digital fingerprint message in time-varying channel conditions is also presented via simulation.

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Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprinting Overlays Using Subspace Embedding

Goergen

Lin

Liu

et al. 2011

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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show abstract

“…Additionally, PHY-layer approaches provide a completely independent authentication mechanism decoupled from higher-layer authentication devices or protocols, allowing the authentication mechanism to be invariant of higher-level protocol changes or revisions. In general, robust authentication devices are crucial to securing wireless systems against message forgery and the malicious actions of impostors, thereby preventing a number of identity attacks to next-generation wireless systems [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprint Embedding for Authenticating MIMO Systems

Goergen

Lin

Liu

et al. 2011

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

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Abstract-A framework for introducing an extrinsic fingerprint signal to space-time coded transmissions at the physical layer is presented, where the fingerprint signal conveys a low capacity cryptographically secure authentication message of arbitrary length. The multi-bit digital fingerprint message conveyed by the fingerprint signal is available to all users within reception range and is used to authenticate the fingerprinted transmission. A novel approach is discussed where the fingerprint signaling mechanism mimics distortions similar to time-varying channel effects. Specifically, the fingerprint is detectable to receivers considering previous channel state information, but will be ignored by receivers equalizing according to current channel state information. Two example fingerprint signaling mechanisms and detection rules are presented based on pulse-amplitude keying and phase-shift keying approaches. The methods for obtaining the real (intrinsic) channel estimate, the extrinsic fingerprint message, and the primary transmission are analytically demonstrated using general pilot embedding schemes. The worst-case distortions caused by non-ideal equalization of a fingerprinted message are derived using the 2x2 Alamouti code. Simulation results including bit error rate (BER) and model mismatch error using a maximum-likelihood (ML) receiver are presented for both the primary and fingerprint signal, while authentication signal BERs lower than the primary signal are demonstrated.

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Survey on Security Issues in Cognitive Radio Network

Dubey¹,

Thakur²

2014

IJIRCCE

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Threats Identification and their Solution in Inter-Basestation Dynamic Resource Sharing IEEE-802.22

Cited by 3 publications

References 6 publications

Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprinting Overlays Using Subspace Embedding

Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprinting Overlays Using Subspace Embedding

Extrinsic Channel-Like Fingerprint Embedding for Authenticating MIMO Systems

Survey on Security Issues in Cognitive Radio Network

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