Three Kinds of “Conservatism”

Stenner, Karen

doi:10.1080/10478400903028615

Cited by 124 publications

(122 citation statements)

References 35 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

118

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Both broad unidimensional representations of ideology, averaging across multiple content domains, and multidimensional representations of ideology, treating each content domain as a separate construct, appear in the literature (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009;Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009;Shafer & Claggett, 1995;Stenner, 2009). As described above, the substantive content comprising conservative vs. liberal ideology is said to include inequality (vs. equality) and opposition to (vs. support of) change (Jost et al, 2003).…”

Section: Conservative-liberal Ideologymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Three factors were extracted based on the observation that the parcels appeared to fall into three content categories commonly considered in research on political ideologyinequality, opposition to change, and strength/punitiveness (e.g., military and crime, although the latter may correspond with the two core values). Such a three-factor view of political preferences corresponds roughly with the model offered by Stenner (2005Stenner ( , 2009) which contrasts laissez-faire attitudes, opposition to change, and authoritarian attitudes.…”

Section: Conservative-liberal Ideologymentioning

confidence: 97%

See 1 more Smart Citation

More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To many commentators and social scientists, Americans' stances on political issues are to an important extent driven by an underlying conservativeliberal ideological dimension. Self-identification as conservative vs. liberal is regarded as a marker of this dimension. However, past research has not thoroughly distinguished between ideological identity (a self-categorization) and ideology (an integrated value system). This research evaluates the thesis that conservative-liberal identity functions as a readiness to adopt beliefs and attitudes about newly politicized issues that one is told are consistent with the socially prescribed meaning of conservatism-liberalism. In Study 1, conservative-liberal identity, measured in 2000, had an independent prospective effect on support for invading Iraq in 2002 and support for the Iraq war in 2004, controlling for substantive ideology, party identity, and demographics. In Study 2, conservative-and liberal-identifiers adopted stances on farm subsidy policy based on randomly varied cues indicating which ideological group supports which stance. This cue-based influence was mediated by adoption of attitude-supportive beliefs. Discussion addresses the joint impact of political discourse and identity-based social influence on the organization of political attitudes.

show abstract

Section: Conservative-liberal Ideologymentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Conservative-liberal Ideologymentioning

confidence: 97%

More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Ideology is often conceptualised as a personality predisposition which precedes expressed attitudes about specific political topics (Feldman and Stenner 1997;Jost et al 2003;Kinder and Kam 2010;Stenner 2005Stenner , 2009Wilson and Patterson 1968). A number of studies suggest that, for instance, individuals who selfidentify on the right of the political spectrum are more resistant to change and diversity (Feldman 2003;Jost et al 2003;Stenner 2009). In this vein, scholars often treat ideological identification as a moderating variable that conditions the impact of other, more specific attitudes on policy preferences.…”

Section: Immigrant Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration: The Role of Regional Context and Individual Predispositions

Karreth¹,

Singh²,

Stojek³

2015

West European Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Existing research makes competing predictions and yields contradictory findings about the relationships between natives' exposure to immigrants and their attitudes toward immigration. Engaging this disjuncture, this article argues that individual predispositions moderate the impact of exposure to immigrants on negative attitudes toward immigrants. Negative attitudes toward immigration are more likely among individuals who are most sensitive to such threats. Because country-level studies are generally unable to appropriately measure the immigration context in which individuals form their attitudes, this article uses a newly collected dataset on regional immigration patterns in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland to test the argument. The data show that increasing and visible diversity is associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants, but only among natives on the political right. This finding improves the understanding of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and has implications for the study of attitudes toward other policies and for immigration policy itself.The relationship between the presence of immigrants and citizens' attitudes toward immigrants and migration policies is uncertain and frequently debated. One perspective represented in many studies suggests that 'an increase in the percentage of ethnic minority members … reduces the majority's prejudice' (Wagner et al. 2006: 380). Another group of studies contradicts this finding, as exemplified by Quillian (1995: 602): 'prejudice is more likely when there is a large foreign presence'. These divergent findings align with the competing predictions from theories of natives' attitudes towards immigrants. Ethnic competition theory and realistic group conflict theory see exposure to outgroups, especially those from ethnically and culturally distinct origins, as leading to anti-immigrant attitudes among natives (Quillian 1995). Conversely, intergroup contact theory (e.g. Allport 1954) argues that larger outgroup populations can engender positive attitudes, although the eponymous 'contact' mechanism takes time to develop and its benefits are conditional on relative socioeconomic equality. On a different

show abstract

“…This value dimension cuts across the traditional 'left/right' divide [47]. We measured authoritarianism through child-rearing values [49] with respondents choosing from a list of 'qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home' those they 'consider to be especially important'.…”

Section: Independent Variable: Values and Social-structural Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also included a standard measure of 'left-right' self-placement [46,47], where respondents placed their own 'views' in 'political matters' on a ten-point scale (rescored to range from 0 to 1), labelled 'left' and 'right' at either end. While the meaning of these labels varies between countries, pro-environment stances generally form part of the bundle of 'left-wing' attitudes in most countries covered by the WVS.…”

Section: Independent Variable: Values and Social-structural Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Current and Future Friends of the Earth: Assessing Cross-National Theories of Environmental Attitudes

Stenner

Nwokora

2015

Energies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Empirical studies of public opinion on environmental protection have typically been grounded in Inglehart's post-materialism thesis, proposing that societal affluence encourages materially-sated publics to look beyond their interests and value the environment. These studies are generally conducted within, or at best across, Western, democratic, industrialized countries. Absence of truly cross-cultural research means the theory's limitations have gone undetected. This article draws on an exceptionally broad dataset-pooling cross-sectional survey data from 80 countries, each sampled at up to three different points over 15 years-to investigate environmental attitudes. We find that post-materialism provides little account of pro-environment attitudes across diverse cultures, and a far from adequate explanation even in the affluent West. We suggest that unique domestic interests, more than broad value systems, are driving emerging global trends in environmental attitudes. The environment's future champions may be the far from 'post-material' citizens of those developing nations most at risk of real material harm from climate change and environmental degradation.

show abstract

Three Kinds of “Conservatism”

Cited by 124 publications

References 35 publications

More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues

More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues

Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration: The Role of Regional Context and Individual Predispositions

Current and Future Friends of the Earth: Assessing Cross-National Theories of Environmental Attitudes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About