Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

Yan, Bo; Wu, Xiaohua; Yu, Bing; Zhang, Yong-wang

doi:10.1108/imds-06-2016-0245

Cited by 69 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 37 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Similar to Ma et al, there are many studies adopting the "cost + revenue sharing" contract [9]- [14]. In addition, buyback contract [15], price subsidy contract [16] and risk compensation contract [11] are relatively common. Different from the above literature, Moon et al find that compared with revenue sharing and cost sharing contracts, an incremental quantity discount contract is more effective for the coordination of fresh food supply chain with fairness concern [17]; Mohammadi et al propose a joint contract for "revenue sharing" and "fresh-keeping technology sharing" [18].…”

Section: A Fresh Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Game Model of a Fresh Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Return Modes

Zhang

2021

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: A Fresh Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Game Model of a Fresh Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Return Modes

Zhang

2021

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…On the basis of the characteristics of perishable foods, Zheng et al [46] designed a fresh food supply chain (FPSC), taking the cost of freshness preservation into account, and the results showed that fresh-keeping cost-sharing and the revenue-sharing contract has the best coordination effect on FPSC. Taking the field of Internet of Things as a research object, Yan et al [47] improved the revenue-sharing contract for the fresh agriculture supply chain to discuss the impact of fresh agricultural products on costs of controlling freshness and market demand. Obviously, the above studies have well documented the motivation of agriculture to use revenue-sharing contracts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordinating a Green Agri-Food Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contracts Considering Retailers’ Green Marketing Efforts

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Serious environmental issues have drawn the attention of the agricultural sector. Consumers’ concerns about their personal health and food safety have stimulated the demand for green agri-food, which has also made it important to focus on the green agri-food supply chain to improve the food quality and reduce the associated environmental concerns. This paper discusses coordination issues of the green agri-food supply chain under the background of farmers’ green farming and retailers’ green marketing, and the impact of a revenue-sharing contract on key decisions of supply chain participants. On the basis of the two-echelon green agri-food supply chain composed of a farmer and a retailer, a revenue-sharing contract was established that takes the cost of farmer’s green farming and retailer’s green marketing into account. Through the comparison of the model results, it is concluded that the revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to not only increase the greening level, but also improve both the farmer’s profit and the retailer’s profit. Moreover, the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract is positively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity to the greening level. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical simulation and some management suggestions are given.

show abstract

“…To the best of our knowledge, disruption occurrence regarding the collection process, which is a significant issue in both theory and practice, has not been studied in the literature. Coordination plans are good means of improving the supply chain profitability ( Hosseini-Motlagh et al, 2018 ) and balance the including parties’ conflict of interests ( Yan et al, 2017 ). Therefore, many papers utilize this approach to manage disruptions in production systems.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Competition aggravates the conflict of interests between parties and adversely affects the profitability of the whole chain, which can be neutralized by an appropriate coordination scheme ( Yan, 2011 ). This is because coordination mechanisms effectively improve the chain’s profitability ( Hosseini-Motlagh et al, 2018 ) and balance the members' conflict of interests ( Yan et al, 2017 ). Various coordination strategies are widely applied in real businesses, such as IBM, Sun Microsystems, and Hewlett Packard ( Heydari et al, 2019 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collection disruption management and channel coordination in a socially concerned closed-loop supply chain: A game theory approach

Hosseini‐Motlagh

Nami

Farshadfar

2020

Journal of Cleaner Production

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Uncertainty in real-world situations disrupts operations, including the collection process in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). A collection disruption is more critical in the pharmaceutical sector since pharmaceutical leftovers contain chemicals that threaten the environment and human health. This paper revolves around the challenges of a real pharmaceutical case that implements circular economy principles through a closed-loop system design, takes sustainability issues into account, and seeks for effective management of collection disruption. The case includes a manufacturer, who invests in green research and development (R&D), and two retailers competing on corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts to boost the collection amount and market demand. This competitive environment raises conflict of interests and complicates the interactions between members, which need to be neutralized by an appropriate coordination plan. This paper proposes an analytical scenario-based coordination model that resolves channel conflicts and pays dividends to the involving members through augmenting their social, economic, and environmental performance. We show that the coordination plan could be a practical policy to increase the system’s adaptability to disruption. Under the coordinated model, by increasing a retailer’s collection disruption, the other one invests more in CSR efforts to compensate for its competitor’s lower collection, preventing loss for the whole channel. We also demonstrate that the proposed model maintains the chain’s balance and prevents loss in case of a highly competitive CSR-based collection and boosts the collection amount, market demand, and the whole chain’s profitability simultaneously.

show abstract

Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

Cited by 69 publications

References 37 publications

Differential Game Model of a Fresh Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Return Modes

Differential Game Model of a Fresh Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Return Modes

Coordinating a Green Agri-Food Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contracts Considering Retailers’ Green Marketing Efforts

Collection disruption management and channel coordination in a socially concerned closed-loop supply chain: A game theory approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About