Tight and Optimal Reductions for Signatures Based on Average Trapdoor Preimage Sampleable Functions and Applications to Code-Based Signatures

Chailloux, André; Debris-Alazard, Thomas

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_16

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…[125]. Later, a tight proof was developed for the GPV scheme with slightly relaxed conditions [126]. The security proof of Fiat-Shamir signatures in QROM was studied in refs.…”

Section: Security Proof In Rom/qrommentioning

confidence: 99%

Lattice‐based cryptosystems in standardisation processes: A survey

Wang

Xiao

2022

IET Information Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The current widely used public‐key cryptosystems are vulnerable to quantum attacks. To prepare for cybersecurity in the quantum era, some projects have been launched to call for post‐quantum alternatives. Due to solid security and desirable performance, lattice‐based cryptosystems are viewed as promising candidates in the upcoming standardisation of post‐quantum cryptography. This study surveys the lattice‐based cryptosystems in the post‐quantum standardisation processes including the NIST Post‐Quantum Cryptography Standardisation and the Chinese Cryptographic Algorithm Design Competition, from both design and security aspects. We present generic design paradigms of lattice‐based schemes and describe several representative proposals and recent progress. We also recap some main cryptanalytic results and methods for estimating the concrete security of lattice‐based schemes.

show abstract

“…[125]. Later, a tight proof was developed for the GPV scheme with slightly relaxed conditions [126]. The security proof of Fiat-Shamir signatures in QROM was studied in refs.…”

Section: Security Proof In Rom/qrommentioning

confidence: 99%

Lattice‐based cryptosystems in standardisation processes: A survey

Wang

Xiao

2022

IET Information Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While the cryptanalytic security of Falcon and its underlying mathematical problem is well studied through best known attacks [PFH + 20, (Section 2.5.1)] and security proofs of the underlying GPV framework in both the random oracle model (ROM) [GPV08] and the quantum random oracle model (QROM) [CD20], its physical security can still be considered as unknown territory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hidden Parallelepiped Is Back Again: Power Analysis Attacks on Falcon

Guerreau

Martinelli

Ricosset

et al. 2022

TCHES

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

FALCON is a very efficient and compact lattice-based signature finalist of the NIST’s Post-Quantum standardization campaign. This work assesses Falcon’s sidechannel resistance by analyzing two vulnerabilities, namely the pre-image computation and the trapdoor sampling. The first attack is an improvement of Karabulut and Aysu (DAC 2021). It overcomes several difficulties inherent to the structure of the stored key like the Fourier representation and directly recovers the key with a limited number of traces and a reduced complexity. The main part of this paper is dedicated to our second attack: we show that a simple power analysis during the signature execution could provide the exact value of the output of a subroutine called the base sampler. This intermediate value does not directly lead to the secret and we had toadapt the so-called hidden parallelepiped attack initially introduced by Nguyen and Regev in Eurocrypt 2006 and reused by Ducas and Nguyen in Asiacrypt 2012. We extensively quantify the resources for our attacks and experimentally demonstrate them with FALCON’s reference implementation on the ELMO simulator (McCann, Oswald and Whitnall USENIX 2017) and on a ChipWhisperer Lite with STM32F3 target (ARM Cortex M4).These new attacks highlight the need for side-channel protection for one of the three finalists of NIST’s standardization campaign by pointing out the vulnerable parts and quantifying the resources of the attacks.

show abstract