2020
DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2020.1766879
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Time after History: Derrida’s Two Readings of Heidegger

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“…In these lectures, however, the strength Derrida ascribes to Hegel's analyses is consistently subordinated to the fact that, ‘for Heidegger, Hegel still remains a metaphysician thinking in the epoch inaugurated or signified by Descartes’ ( QBH : 201). Although Tsagdis is right to note that, in these lectures, ‘Hegel appears to be a strange exception in [the] history’ of metaphysics (2020: 325), Derrida argues, likewise, that ‘in spite of the immense progress marked by [Hegel's] concept of refutation as soon as one wishes to take seriously what a history of truth and a history of philosophy can be, in spite of the proximity between this Hegelian relation to the history of philosophy and the Heideggerian relation to the history of philosophy, there remains a decisive difference […] between Hegel and Heidegger […]’ ( QBH : 6), the nature of which was discussed in this paper.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In these lectures, however, the strength Derrida ascribes to Hegel's analyses is consistently subordinated to the fact that, ‘for Heidegger, Hegel still remains a metaphysician thinking in the epoch inaugurated or signified by Descartes’ ( QBH : 201). Although Tsagdis is right to note that, in these lectures, ‘Hegel appears to be a strange exception in [the] history’ of metaphysics (2020: 325), Derrida argues, likewise, that ‘in spite of the immense progress marked by [Hegel's] concept of refutation as soon as one wishes to take seriously what a history of truth and a history of philosophy can be, in spite of the proximity between this Hegelian relation to the history of philosophy and the Heideggerian relation to the history of philosophy, there remains a decisive difference […] between Hegel and Heidegger […]’ ( QBH : 6), the nature of which was discussed in this paper.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%