Time preference, the environment and the interests of future generations

Wesley, Edgar B.; Peterson, F. Ross

doi:10.1007/bf01965479

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

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“…One challenge to this position is that even with several degrees of global warming future generations in Norway are likely to be better off than people alive today (Arrow et al, 2013;Wesley & Peterson, 1993). The sacrifice discourse (i.e.…”

Section: Trade-offsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Norwegian Oil Fund in a Warming World: What are the Interests of Future Generations?

Bhopal

2021

Ethics, Policy & Environment

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The intended beneficiaries of the Norwegian Oil Fund are current and future generations of Norwegians, with the interests of current generations served through the expenditure of revenues on public services and the interests of future generations met by increasing the value of the fund. This formulation is reexamined in light of climate change and found to be narrow and incomplete and in tension with reducing carbon emissions in line with the Paris Agreement. I argue that a collective vision encompassing the financial and non-financial interests of current and future generations is needed and highlight the role of greater public deliberation.

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Section: Trade-offsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Norwegian Oil Fund in a Warming World: What are the Interests of Future Generations?

Bhopal

2021

Ethics, Policy & Environment

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Intergenerational Impartiality: Replacing Discounting by Probability Weighting

2005

J Agric Environ Ethics

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Intergenerational impartiality requires putting the welfare of future generations at par with that of our own. However, rational choice requires weighting all welfare values by the respective probabilities of realization. As the risk of nonsurvival of mankind is strictly positive for all time periods and as the probability of non-survival is cumulative, the probability weights operate like discount factors, though justified on a morally justifiable and completely different ground. Impartial intertemporal welfare maximization is acceptable, though the welfare of people in the very far future has lower effects as the probabilities of their existence are also lower. However, the effective discount rate on future welfare values (distinct from monetary values) justified on this ground is likely to be less than 0.1% per annum. Such discounting does not compromise environmental protection and sustainability unduly. The finiteness of our universe implies that the sum of our expected welfare to infinity remains finite, solving the paradox of having to compare different infinite values in optimal growth/conservation theories.

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