Time, Term Limits, and Turnover: Trends in Membership Stability in U.S. State Legislatures

Abstract

Increases in legislative professionalization along with the implementation of term limits in about one-third of the American states raise significant questions about the path of state house and senate turnover. We first update turnover figures for all states, by chamber, from the mid-1980s through 2002. We then compare turnover rates in states with and without term limits. We find that turnover rates, overall, continued to decline through the 1980s but that the long downward trend abated in the 1990s as a result of term limits. The effects of term limits vary depending on the length of the term limit and the opportunity structure in the state. There is also a strong relationship between the presence of term limits and interchamber movement. In addition to term limits, professionalization levels, redistricting, the presence of multi-member districts, and partisan swings explain differences in turnover rates between states

Legislative term limits and state spending

“…Following previous studies (see e.g., Carey et al 2000b;Johnson and Crain 2004;Meinke and Hasecke 2003;Moncrief et al 2004), a dummy variable is used to indicate if a state has implemented term limits. This variable is coded 0 before a state implements term limits and 1 beginning with the legislative session before term limits are implemented.…”

Voter Behavior and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics

“…9 Empirical analysis of state legislatures suggests term limits limit incumbents" ability to promise service and favors leading to less campaign contributions and more competitive elections (Daniel and Lott 1997;Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2004). This correlates well with the finding that incumbents in their final term spend significantly less time and effort acquiring district specific benefits and pork (Carey, Niemi and Powell 1998).…”

“…Creating more turn over in the legislature will also reduce the redistributive effects of pork-barrel legislation (Dick and Lott 1993, Daniel and Lott 1997, Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2004). …”

Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983

“…legislators' financial interests on votes on mortgage disclosure, air pollution control and oil company tax rebates). It has also been shown to have a strong influence on the decision about whether to run for, or retire from, office (Fiorina 1994;Hall and Van Houweling 1995;Hibbing 1982;Hogan 2003;Moncrief et al 2001;Moncrief et al 2004;Rosenthal 1974;Squire 1988). I do not suggest that financial self-interest will matter equally for all legislators on all sorts of votes and decisions.…”