Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses

Shmatikov, Vitaly; Wang, Ming-Hsiu

doi:10.1007/11863908_2

Cited by 201 publications

(166 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Adaptive Padding (AP) was proposed by Shmatikov and Wang to defend against end-to-end traffic analysis [18]. Even though WF attacks are significantly different from these end-to-end attacks, AP can be adapted to protecting against WF due to its generality and flexibility.…”

Section: Adaptive Paddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…AP has the defender examine the outgoing traffic pattern and generate dummy messages in a targeted manner to disrupt distinctive features of the patterns -"statistically unlikely" delays between packets. Shmatikov and Wang showed that with 50% bandwidth overhead, the accuracy of end-to-end timing-based traffic analysis is significantly degraded [18].…”

Section: Adaptive Paddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since sending a real packet means that the timeout expired, AP has to correct the distribution by returning the token to its bin and removing a token from the bin representing the actual delay. This prevents the combined distribution of padding and real traffic from skewing towards short values and allows AP to adapt to the current transmission rate [18]. If a bin runs out of tokens, to minimize its effect on the resulting distribution of inter-arrival times, we remove tokens from the next non-empty greater bin [18].…”

Section: Design Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This prevents the combined distribution of padding and real traffic from skewing towards short values and allows AP to adapt to the current transmission rate [18]. If a bin runs out of tokens, to minimize its effect on the resulting distribution of inter-arrival times, we remove tokens from the next non-empty greater bin [18]. In case all bins are empty, we refill the histogram with the initial sample.…”

Section: Design Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense

Juárez

Imani

Perry

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

199

175

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Abstract. Website Fingerprinting attacks enable a passive eavesdropper to recover the user's otherwise anonymized web browsing activity by matching the observed traffic with prerecorded web traffic templates. The defenses that have been proposed to counter these attacks are impractical for deployment in real-world systems due to their high cost in terms of added delay and bandwidth overhead. Further, these defenses have been designed to counter attacks that, despite their high success rates, have been criticized for assuming unrealistic attack conditions in the evaluation setting. In this paper, we propose a novel, lightweight defense based on Adaptive Padding that provides a sufficient level of security against website fingerprinting, particularly in realistic evaluation conditions. In a closed-world setting, this defense reduces the accuracy of the state-ofthe-art attack from 91% to 20%, while introducing zero latency overhead and less than 60% bandwidth overhead. In an open-world, the attack precision is just 1% and drops further as the number of sites grows.

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Section: Adaptive Paddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Adaptive Paddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Design Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Design Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense

Juárez

Imani

Perry

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

199

175

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This choice means that Tor circuits are vulnerable to endto-end correlation attacks: an attacker who can measure traffic at both ends of the circuit can link them [10,28]. A variety of other anonymity-breaking attacks become possible because of Tor's requirement to remain useful for low-latency communications [26,29,35,36,41,44].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Incentives into Tor

Ngan

Dingledine

Wallach

2010

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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Abstract. Distributed anonymous communication networks like Tor depend on volunteers to donate their resources. However, the efforts of Tor volunteers have not grown as fast as the demands on the Tor network. We explore techniques to incentivize Tor users to relay Tor traffic too; if users contribute resources to the Tor overlay, they should receive faster service in return. In our design, the central Tor directory authorities measure performance and publish a list of Tor relays that should be given higher priority when establishing circuits. Simulations of our proposed design show that conforming users receive significant improvements in performance, in some cases experiencing twice the network throughput of selfish users who do not relay traffic for the Tor network.

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Non-expanding Transaction Specific Pseudonymization for IP Traffic Monitoring

Øverlier

Brekne

Årnes

2005

Cryptology and Network Security

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The request for on-line privacy is rapidly increasing. More and more Internet users realize that information about their on-line activities is highly valuable information for commercial companies and open for potential abuse. Information about who communicates with whom, and who accesses which services, is already used to improve on-line services, e.g. by serving more relevant on-line advertisements which many appreciate. But the problem of letting large commercial companies know your entire surfing history does not seem to be of major concern to the average Internet user. Future services may look into how to prevent this type of information leakage, but this will not help the users of today. In addition, anonymous publication of information, e.g. by dissidents and whistle-blowers, is made nearly impossible for today's Internet users. There exists a need for censorship-resistant Internet services, where anonymous publishing of information can be made. These types of services are already starting to appear. They are combined with anonymizing technologies, and designed to be attack-resistant, accessible from anywhere, have a hidden physical location, and therefore they will be more censorship-resistant. The overall goal of the research work was to address vulnerabilities in, and to develop new or enhance existing anonymizing network technologies and censorship-resistant services. This thesis presents both analyses and new principles to enhance the anonymizing technology existing today. The first phase of the research work consisted of an analysis of traffic flow confidentiality in a future military network setting, and an analysis of how to securely anonymize traffic data logs at high-speed interconnections. The thesis presents a new method for securing these logs by creating transaction specific pseudonyms without increasing the amount of logged data. The thesis also presents solutions to allow some elements of the traffic data to be used for statistical analysis and therefore be available for search, while

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Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses

Cited by 201 publications

References 25 publications

Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense

Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense

Building Incentives into Tor

Non-expanding Transaction Specific Pseudonymization for IP Traffic Monitoring

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