Timing and eco(nomic) efficiency of climate-friendly investments in supply chains

Lukas, Elmar; Welling, Andreas

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2013.03.017

Cited by 49 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Kumar and Managi (2009) also verified that substantial oil price-induced technological progress at the world level has emerged when long-term oil prices are rising. More recently, Lukas and Welling (2014) point out that the European Union emissions trading scheme creates financial incentives for companies to invest in climate-friendly innovations in order to reconcile economic efficiency with ecological efficiency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis on China's eco-innovations: Regulation context, intertemporal change and regional differences

Yang

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis on China's eco-innovations: Regulation context, intertemporal change and regional differences

Yang

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…One response from regulatory and policy makers is to introduce various carbon emissions reduction policies such as mandatory carbon emission capacity and carbon emission taxes. In addition, many governments have also supplemented traditional "command and control" with emission trade schemes through which creating financial incentives for companies to invest in green innovations (Adit and Dutta, 2004;Stavins, 2008;Chaabane et al, 2012;Lukas and Welling, 2014). Among these schemes, cap-and-trade is one of the most influential regulatory policies, which provides the manufacturing sector a flexible market mechanism and a viable carbon emission reduction method.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of co-opetition in low carbon manufacturing

Zheng

Chen

Wang

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

221

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Low carbon manufacturing has become a strategic objective for many developed and developing economies. This study examines the role of co-opetition in achieving this objective. We investigate the pricing and emissions reduction policies for two rival manufacturers with different emission reduction efficiencies under the cap-and-trade policy.We assume that the product demand is price and emission sensitive. Based on non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal solutions for the two manufacturers are derived in the purely competitive and co-opetitive market environments respectively. Through the discussion and numerical analysis, we uncovered that in both pure competition and co-opetition models, the two manufacturers' optimal prices depend on the unit price of carbon emission trading. In addition, higher emission reduction efficiency leads to lower optimal unit carbon emissions and higher profit in both the pure competition and co-petition models.Interestingly, compared to pure competition, co-opetition will lead to more profit and less total carbon emissions. However, the improvement in economic and environmental performance is based on higher product prices and unit carbon emissions.

show abstract

“…Chen et al [24] and Hua et al [25] use the EOQ model in analyzing how firms manage carbon footprints in inventory management under the carbon emission trading mechanism scenario. Lukas and Welling [26] demonstrated that economic and ecological efficiency continue to be mutually exclusive under uncertainty in emission allowance prices. The problem worsens when the carbon reduction project hinges upon investing in the whole supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diverse Schemes of Cost Pooling for Carbon-Reduction Outsourcing in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

Wang

Zhao

et al. 2018

Energies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Among responses to governmental regulations for curbing carbon emissions, outsourcing carbon reduction to a specialized third-party is an important means to satisfy a variety of carbon-emission restraints. In this situation, however, designing efficient contracts for emission reducing while retaining appropriate supply-chain profit is a substantial but challenging problem. We therefore refine this from practice and consider a low-carbon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to analyze in which conditions the system should outsource its carbon reduction efforts to an external expert firm under the assumption that consumers with a sense of social responsibility prefer low carbon products. In the decarbonization expert firm embedded supply chain, we examine the respective impacts of three cost-pooling schemes for emission reduction on supply chain performances. We find that the manufacturer-undertaking contract is the worst in terms of profit and carbon reduction level among the contracts being studied, while the retailer-undertaking contract yields the best outcome in terms of the profit and performs well in carbon reduction when the contractor has cost efficiency in carbon reduction, which is even better than the joint-undertaking contract in carbon reduction when the contractor is inefficient. The study shows the diversity of contracts on outsourcing carbon reduction significantly impacts the supply chain profitability, carbon reduction efficiency and sustainability of operations.

show abstract

Timing and eco(nomic) efficiency of climate-friendly investments in supply chains

Cited by 49 publications

References 33 publications

Analysis on China's eco-innovations: Regulation context, intertemporal change and regional differences

Analysis on China's eco-innovations: Regulation context, intertemporal change and regional differences

The role of co-opetition in low carbon manufacturing

Diverse Schemes of Cost Pooling for Carbon-Reduction Outsourcing in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About