Timing attacks against trusted path

Trostle, Jonathan

doi:10.1109/secpri.1998.674829

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Trostle [9] describe timing attacks against the trusted path mechanism. Only a few trials were needed to obtain the length of the password with the first attack type.…”

Section: Related Work and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Password Generation and Search Space Reduction

Helkala¹,

Snekkenes²

2009

JCP

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Abstract-It is easy for humans to design passwords that are easily remembered. However, such passwords may have a predictable structure, making exhaustive search feasible. We have divided human-generated passwords into three categories: Non-word passwords, Mixture passwords, and Word passwords; depending on their overall structure. Within these categories, we have analyzed the search-space reduction of several common password sub-structures. From this analysis, we have derived guidelines that yield strong passwords within in each password category. Our results contribute towards the goal of achieving both strong and memorable passwords.

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“…Trostle [9] describe timing attacks against the trusted path mechanism. Only a few trials were needed to obtain the length of the password with the first attack type.…”

Section: Related Work and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Password Generation and Search Space Reduction

Helkala¹,

Snekkenes²

2009

JCP

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“…However, we can imagine combining the timing analysis with the acoustic attack described herein to make decisions about the key clicks that were not unambiguously recognized based on the acoustic data alone. A related software-only timing attack is described in [21].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keyboard acoustic emanations

Asonov

Agrawal

IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004

221

225

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“…Trostle [14] presents a side channel against the Xlock program, using information associated with X Windows processing. [14] shows that keyboard interrupts and X processing can be detected and measured by an unprivileged process running on the system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[14] shows that keyboard interrupts and X processing can be detected and measured by an unprivileged process running on the system. Classical covert channel countermeasures [3,15,4] will have some effectiveness in limiting or closing side channels as well.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Side Channels Targeted at Passwords

Tannous

Trostle

Hassan

et al. 2008

2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)

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Side channels are typically viewed as attacks that leak cryptographic keys during cryptographic algorithm processing, by observation of system side effects. In this paper, we present new side channels that leak password information during X Windows keyboard processing of password input. Keylogging is one approach for stealing passwords, but current keylogging techniques require special hardware or privileged processes. However, we have found that the unprivileged operation of modifying the user key mappings for X Windows clients enables a side channel sufficient for unprivileged processes to steal that user's passwords, even enabling the attacker to gain root access via sudo. We successfully tested one version on Linux 2.6; we were able to obtain a high degree of control over the scheduler, and thus we can obtain accurate timing information. A second version (logon detection) works without depending on accurate clocks or cache effects. Thus, in addition to demonstrating new side channels, we show that (a) side channels cannot be eliminated by removing accurate clocks or hardware cache mechanisms (b) side channels are of continued concern for computer security as well as cryptographic processing.

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Timing attacks against trusted path

Cited by 14 publications

References 6 publications

Password Generation and Search Space Reduction

Password Generation and Search Space Reduction

Keyboard acoustic emanations

New Side Channels Targeted at Passwords

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