Timing Is Everything: Economic Sanctions, Regime Type, and Domestic Instability

Major, Solomon

doi:10.1080/03050629.2012.640253

Cited by 29 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 29 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Particularly the work of Hufbauer et al (1985Hufbauer et al ( , 2007 has been ground breaking in refining the economic and political determinants of effective sanctions. The growing interest in the economic sanctions literature regarding the relation between effective economic sanctions and regime type showed that democracies are more vulnerable for certain types of sanctions than autocracies (e.g., Allen, 2005;Brooks, 2002;Major, 2012). Some large N-studies have looked into the effects of comprehensive economic sanctions on development, and conclude that they tend to have large unintended but detrimental effects on citizens in target countries.…”

Section: (B) Lever For Political Changementioning

confidence: 97%

Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article argues that a new generation of Political Conditionalities has emerged during the last decade. This requires an expansion of the original definition and research agenda. Beyond the traditional questions of use and effectiveness however, there is also a need to dig deeper into the dynamics surrounding political conditionalities, particularly the bargaining processes and outcomes along the aid chain -from domestic donor politics, donor harmonization fora, policy dialog spaces to the political economy of recipient institutional reform and donor-coping strategies-because they influence the set-up, use, follow-up, purpose, and effectiveness of PCs.

show abstract

Section: (B) Lever For Political Changementioning

confidence: 97%

Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Autocratic leaders mitigate the destabilization effect differently: they reduce domestic opposition by resorting to human rights abuses, political repression, and power consolidation (Peksen 2009;2010;Peksen and Drury 2010;Wood 2008). However, when faced with a highly organized and active domestic opposition, autocracies also become more politically vulnerable and, hence, choose to concede (Major 2012). In sum, target leaders' efforts to reduce sanctions' political costs indicate leaders' awareness of the destabilization effect.…”

Section: Sanctions and Leadership Changementioning

confidence: 99%

Political Relations, Leader Stability, and Economic Coercion

McLean

Radtke

2018

International Studies Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Countries use economic sanctions as a way to force their opponents to make policy concessions. Such external pressure may, as the designers of sanctions often intend, affect the degree of domestic support for the target's political leaders. It may even threaten the leaders' survival in office. We investigate how these dual pressures-preference for policy concessions and concern about target leaders' political future-shape the use of sanctions in the context of political relations between the sanctioning and sanctioned countries. The political relations between the two countries matter because a decline in the likelihood of the target leader's political survival results in a cost for the sanctioner when the target is a friendly regime and generates a benefit when the targeted regime is an adversary. Therefore, we argue, and show statistically, that economic coercion is more likely for friendly governments when they are politically stable and unfriendly governments when they are politically vulnerable. We illustrate our causal mechanism using declassified primary sources for two case studies of US sanctions against Chile.

show abstract

“…Though inflation slowed to 5 per cent by August 2012, it has started rising again, and as of October it stood at 7 per cent. In that context, as Major (2012) surmised for non-democratic regimes, Vietnam would be very vulnerable in the present situation to economic sanctions by China aimed at creating general macro-economic instability. However, this vulnerability also depends on the nature of political concessions that may be demanded by China.…”

Section: General Sanctions Aimed At Causing Macroeconomic Instabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies have shown that, generally, a democratic polity is more vulnerable to economic sanctions and more likely to give in to modest demands when the sanctions are directed at the general economy of the target or against particular interest groups (Allen 2005;Brooks 2002). A non-democracy may be more vulnerable if the sanctions target elite members of the regime (Kirshner 1997;Brooks 2002) or are implemented or ongoing during conditions of economic downturn, when the stability of the regime depends on a stable economy (Major 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's Potential for Economic Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Study of the Philippines and Vietnam

Ravindran¹

2012

Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With tensions rising in the South China Sea, China's use of its economic leverage over Southeast Asian countries has recently come into focus. With increasing economic and trade ties between China and Southeast Asia, the question being asked is whether China can successfully impose economic sanctions to gain policy concessions in the South China Sea disputes. This paper examines China's relations with the Philippines and Vietnam and analyses the possibility of a successful economic sanction by China against these two countries in future disputes. The article concludes that Vietnam may be more vulnerable economically to Chinese sanctions than the Philippines. However, political factors would offset that vulnerability in the case of Vietnam and amplify it in the case of the Philippines, making the Philippines more likely to concede to modest political demands.

show abstract

Timing Is Everything: Economic Sanctions, Regime Type, and Domestic Instability

Cited by 29 publications

References 29 publications

Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid

Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid

Political Relations, Leader Stability, and Economic Coercion

China's Potential for Economic Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Study of the Philippines and Vietnam

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About