Timing together, acting together. Phenomenology of intersubjective temporality and social cognition

Abstract

In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl's account of intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of the other's harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective (passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in the field of social cognition. I argue that these levels of empathy are related with different levels of intersubjective temporality. By the intersubjective temporality I do not understand being in the same moment of objective time (so called clock time) but rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of actions. In the final part, I gather my considerations together and propose a general three-level framework of intersubjective temporality.

Synchronization, Attention and Transformation: Multidimensional Exploration of the Aesthetic Experience of Contemporary Dance Spectators

“…We have extracted and modified some questions from their questionnaire, for instance “I found these performances intellectually stimulating” and added others such as “this piece tells a story”. Temporal modulations and qualities: rhythm, duration, speed, flow: As we discussed in the introduction, intersubjective temporality does not correspond so much to being in the same moment of objective time (clock time) but rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of action and affect [ 11 , 15 , 19 , 117 , 120 , 132 ]. We included questions that sought to explore the lived experience of temporality and rhythm for the audience.…”

“…Stern [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 118 ] and Trevarthen [ 119 ] have argued for the existence of primary intersubjectivity in infants based on rhythmicity of performances (e.g., movements, facial gestures, vocalization). At the crossroads of phenomenology and cognitive sciences, more than being “in” the same moment of objective time (clock-time), intersubjective temporality is understood as the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of action and affect [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 19 , 117 , 119 , 120 , 121 ]. In this vein, Tschacher et al [ 122 ] propose intersubjective movement synchrony as a window into shared nowness.…”

The constitutive function of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology

“…By calling them "fundamental attunements", Heidegger tried to show that phenomena such as anxiety, profound boredom, and astonishment are not thematic or object-directed, rather they are disclosing Dasein's beingin-the-world. 3 But what about the simpler contents of our consciousness, such as the sensations of color, pleasure, or warmth. They are, of course, mental phenomena, but are they intentional?…”

Intersubjetividad E Individuación en Husserl Y Habermas: De La Necesidad De Un Cambio De Paradigma a La Complementación

“…Por ejemplo, el ritmo vocal de las madres se correlacionó positivamente con el compás de movimientos realizado por el infante (Stern, 1985). La estructura rítmica y temporal del comportamiento que expresa estados afectivos juega un papel primordial en las relaciones primarias entre el infante y sus cuidadores (Pokropski, 2015). La estructura diádica, basada en patrones temporales, que emerge entre el Self y el otro, constituye una "resonancia intercorporal" (Froese y Fuchs 2012): las emociones físicamente expresadas de un sujeto afectan la experiencia corporal del otro y viceversa.…”