Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming under a Performance Accountability System

Cullen, Julie Berry; Reback, Randall

doi:10.1016/s0278-0984(06)14001-8

Cited by 138 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Research on quality disclosure in education often focuses on accountability or the supply side-how schools respond to the disclosure of information about the schools. Examples include Carnoy and Loeb (2002), Hanushek and Raymond (2004), Jacob (2005), Peterson and West (2003), Haney (2000), Cullen and Reback (2006), and Figlio and Getzler (2006). 4.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Student Responsiveness to Earnings Data in the College Scorecard

Hurwitz

Smith

2017

Economic Inquiry

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Using the universe of SAT score sends to colleges and the exact date on which these scores are sent, we estimate how students responded to the release of the U.S. Department of Education's College Scorecard in September 2015. We find that data on annual cost and graduation rate, both of which were previously available, did not impact the volume of score sends received by colleges. By contrast, we estimate that each 10% increase in reported earnings resulted in a 2.4% increase in score sends. The impact is driven almost entirely by well‐resourced high schools and students. We find little evidence that the count or composition of enrolled students changed as a result of the Scorecard information shock with the exception of a slight increase in academic preparedness, as measured by SAT scores, among enrollees at colleges with higher reported earnings. (JEL I2, I23, I26, I28, L15)

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Student Responsiveness to Earnings Data in the College Scorecard

Hurwitz

Smith

2017

Economic Inquiry

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“…These studies address the concern that teaching to the test artificially inflates test scores following the introduction of high-stakes testing. See Cullen and Reback (2006) for an assessment of strategic efforts among Texas schools to improve reported scores by manipulating which students are exempt from testing. Jacob and Levitt (2003) provide evidence that some teachers or principals in Chicago actually changed student answers after highstakes assessments in the 1990s.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability

Neal

Schanzenbach

2010

Review of Economics and Statistics

281

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We show that within the Chicago Public Schools, both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district-level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution but not among the least academically advantaged students. The stringency of proficiency requirements varied among the programs implemented for different grades in different years, and our results suggest that changes in proficiency requirements induce teachers to shift more attention to students who are near the current proficiency standard. © 2010 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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“…Previous work has demonstrated that schools often respond strategically to the implementation of a performance measurement system (e.g., Cullen & Reback, 2006;Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Jacob, 2005;Jacob & Levitt, 2003). One strategy that MPCP schools could potentially employ in response to the new high-stakes testing policy could involve manipulation of the pool of lowperforming students who must take the WKCE.…”

Section: "Intent To Treat" and Representative Mps Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

High-Stakes Choice

Witte

Wolf

Cowen

et al. 2014

Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis

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This article considers the impact of a high-stakes testing and reporting requirement on students using publicly funded vouchers to attend private schools. We describe how such a policy was implemented during the course of a previously authorized multi-year evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, which provided us with data on voucher students before and after the reform, as well as on public school students who received no new policy treatment. Our results indicate substantial growth for voucher students in the first high-stakes testing year, particularly in mathematics, and for students with higher levels of earlier academic achievement. We discuss these results in the context of both the school choice and accountability literatures.

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Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming under a Performance Accountability System

Cited by 138 publications

References 16 publications

Student Responsiveness to Earnings Data in the College Scorecard

Student Responsiveness to Earnings Data in the College Scorecard

Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability

High-Stakes Choice

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