TinyTate: Computing the Tate Pairing in Resource-Constrained Sensor Nodes

Oliveira, Leonardo B.; Aranha, Diego F.; Morais, Eduardo; Daguano, Felipe; López, Julio; Dahab, Ricardo

doi:10.1109/nca.2007.48

Cited by 83 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…In the literature we can find some papers (e.g [30,31,32,33,34,35,10]) that envision WSNs as a scenario in which to exploit Pairing-based Cryptography (PBC). Of those related to pairing implementation on sensor nodes, McCusker et al [33] have focused on a hardware solution that both implements primitives for computing the Tate pairing and meets the strict energy constraints of sensor nodes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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NanoECC: Testing the Limits of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Sensor Networks

Szczechowiak

Oliveira

Scott

et al.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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234

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Abstract. By using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), it has been recently shown that Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) is indeed feasible on resource-constrained nodes. This feasibility, however, does not necessarily mean attractiveness, as the obtained results are still not satisfactory enough. In this paper, we present results on implementing ECC, as well as the related emerging field of Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC), on two of the most popular sensor nodes. By doing that, we show that PKC is not only viable, but in fact attractive for WSNs. As far as we know pairing computations presented in this paper are the most efficient results on the MICA2 (8-bit/7.3828-MHz ATmega128L) and Tmote Sky nodes.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This fact has motivated work on how to compute PKC efficiently in sensor nodes (e.g., [7,8,9,10]). The problem is challenging because those tiny devices have very limited battery life and we cannot afford to spend too much processor time on additional computations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

NanoECC: Testing the Limits of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Sensor Networks

Szczechowiak

Oliveira

Scott

et al.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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234

123

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“…, 255}. The trace t i is recorded while the device encrypts the input data m i with the use of the fixed secret key k ∈ {0, 1} 128 . Each trace consists of N points in time, i.e., N is the length of the traces and thus, t i = (t i,1 , .…”

Section: Cryptanalysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, we describe the cryptanalytic details for the case that another pairing, the reduced Tate pairing, is attacked with a secondorder attack. We analyze the same implementation of the Tate pairing as used in TinyTate, which is an implementation of the Tate pairing for sensor nodes [128].…”

Section: Cryptanalysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This algorithm is named after its developers Barreto, Kim, Lynn, and Scott and is called BKLS algorithm. The same algorithm for projective coordinates is used in TinyTate, an implementation of the Tate pairing for sensor nodes [128]. For this example, we make use of the exemplary nonsingular curve E : y 2 = x 3 − 3x + B with B ∈ F q , q = 3 mod 4 and embedding degree k = 2 [152].…”

Section: Algorithm 52 Bkls Algorithm For the Computation Of The Redumentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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Internet of Things device authentication via electromagnetic fingerprints

Souza

Carlson

Ramos

et al. 2020

Engineering Reports

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We quickly approach a future where Internet of Things (IoT) devices are the norm. In this scenario, humans are surrounded by a multitude of heterogeneous devices that assist them in almost every aspect of their daily routines. The realization of this future demands strong authentication guarantees to ensure that these devices are not abused and that their users are not endangered. However, providing authentication for these systems is challenging due to the high heterogeneity of IoT applications. In this paper, we first review several IoT application scenarios and promising authentication methods for each. We identify th e key characteristics of each IoT application scenario, present the strengths and weaknesses of prominent authentication methods from the literature, and review which authentication methods have been proposed in the literature for each application. Then, we present a novel authentication method for IoT based on electromagnetic noise. The key advantage of electromagnetic noise is that any electronic device intrinsically generates electromagnetic noise during normal operation. We extract features from these electromagnetic emanations and use machine learning algorithms to identify devices based on these features. Our method achieves 77% accuracy when identifying devices among a set of seven devices.

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TinyTate: Computing the Tate Pairing in Resource-Constrained Sensor Nodes

Cited by 83 publications

References 39 publications

NanoECC: Testing the Limits of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Sensor Networks

NanoECC: Testing the Limits of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Sensor Networks

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Internet of Things device authentication via electromagnetic fingerprints

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