TMI-2 - A Case Study for PWR Instrumentation Performance during a Severe Accident

Rempe, J. L.; Knudson, D. L.

doi:10.2172/1097179

Cited by 15 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…As described in [1], instrumentation response suggests that core uncovery began between 114 and 120 minutes and that the vessel liquid level had dropped to the core midplane by approximately 140 minutes. Insufficient decay heat removal associated with core uncovery is estimated to have led to upper regions of the core heating to temperatures that caused the cladding to overheat, balloon, and rupture.…”

Section: B Accident Synopsismentioning

confidence: 87%

“…2. As described in [1], significant events occurring during the initial stages of the accident included turbine isolation (defined as time zero in Fig. 2), reactor trip (when reactor pressure reached 16.3 MPa at 10 seconds after turbine trip), RCS heat up and pressurization.…”

Section: B Accident Synopsismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In preparation addressing this need, a review was recently completed to gain insights from TMI-2 sensor survivability and data qualification efforts [1]. Over 100 references related to instrumentation performance and post-accident evaluations of TMI-2 sensors and measurements were reviewed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Instrumentation performance during the TMI-2 accident

Rempe¹,

Knudson²

2013

2013 3rd International Conference on Advancements in Nuclear Instrumentation, Measurement Methods and Their Applications (ANIMM

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The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor provided a unique opportunity to evaluate sensors exposed to severe accident conditions. Conditions associated with the release of coolant and the hydrogen burn that occurred during this accident exposed instrumentation to harsh conditions, including direct radiation, radioactive contamination, and high humidity with elevated temperatures and pressures. As part of a program initiated by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), a review was completed to gain insights from prior TMI-2 sensor survivability and data qualification efforts. This new effort focused upon a set of sensors that provided critical data to TMI-2 operators for assessing the condition of the plant and the effects of mitigating actions taken by these operators. In addition, the effort considered sensors providing data required for subsequent accident simulations.Over 100 references related to instrumentation performance and post-accident evaluations of TMI-2 sensors and measurements were reviewed. Insights gained from this review are summarized within this paper. As noted within this paper, several techniques were invoked in the TMI-2 post-accident program to evaluate sensor survivability status and data qualification, including comparisons with data from other sensors, analytical calculations, laboratory testing, and comparisons with sensors subjected to similar conditions in largescale integral tests and with sensors that were similar in design but more easily removed from the TMI-2 plant for evaluations. Conclusions from this review provide important insights related to sensor survivability and enhancement options for improving sensor performance. In addition, this paper provides recommendations related to sensor survivability and the data evaluation process that could be implemented in upcoming Fukushima Daiichi recovery efforts.

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Section: B Accident Synopsismentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: B Accident Synopsismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Instrumentation performance during the TMI-2 accident

Rempe¹,

Knudson²

2013

2013 3rd International Conference on Advancements in Nuclear Instrumentation, Measurement Methods and Their Applications (ANIMM

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“…As seen with the analysis of the TMI-2 event, many insights to what occurred were not available until at least a decade after the event. Gaining these insights required an integrated process including postaccident videos; examinations of samples of core debris and vessel structures; instrumentation data; calculations with "best-estimate" severe accident analysis tools; separate effects laboratory tests; and, in some cases, data from large integral tests [15]. Just as there was insufficient data available from any single source to develop a complete understanding about the TMI-2 accident, it is reasonable to expect a similar situation at Fukushima Daiichi and the need for a similar analysis to interpret and integrate information for the accident at Fukushima Daiichi.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fukushima Daiichi - A Case Study for BWR Instrumentation and Control Systems Performance during a Severe Accident Rev 0

Clayton¹,

Poore²

2013

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This document summarizes available information regarding instrumentation performance, with a focus on the first few days of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power station in Japan on March 11, 2011. Specifically, the report identifies some of the key parameters typically used for boiling water reactor (BWR)/3 with a Mark I containment (BWR/3-Mark I) and BWR/4-Mark I accident evaluations and what sensors are available to monitor these parameters, either directly or indirectly, within the reactor vessel, drywell, suppression pool, and reactor building. For each parameter, a description is provided regarding the measured data, observations related to the sensor survivability, and the confidence in the instrument readings for the parameter. Analyses of assessments of the Fukushima Daiichi accident were performed to assess the performance of key instrumentation during this event. The analyses included observation by Japanese experts regarding instrumentation performance, alternative measurement capabilities, and comparisons of instrument readings. The forensic analyses of plant instrumentation failures will be a long-term effort. Therefore, this report focuses on the information available in the control room during the accident and illustrates challenges the operators faced in their understanding of Fukushima Daiichi's conditions during the progression of the accident.

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“…The external source of ignition can be as small as a simple spark, or a hot wire. In a NPP there are several [87,88] potential igniters that can start the combustion of hydrogen and oxygen. Therefore, in nuclear safety it is important to maintain the hydrogen risk as lower as possible and the fewer time possible in flammability conditions as well.…”

Section: Hydrogen Ignitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis and improvement of hydrogen mitigation strategies during a severe accident in nuclear containments

Fernández-Cosials¹

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TMI-2 - A Case Study for PWR Instrumentation Performance during a Severe Accident

Cited by 15 publications

References 43 publications

Instrumentation performance during the TMI-2 accident

Instrumentation performance during the TMI-2 accident

Fukushima Daiichi - A Case Study for BWR Instrumentation and Control Systems Performance during a Severe Accident Rev 0

Analysis and improvement of hydrogen mitigation strategies during a severe accident in nuclear containments

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