To Martyr or Not to Martyr: Jihad is the Question, What Policy is the Answer?

Abstract

The question of what policies may deter risk-taking actors who willingly commit suicide is not only theoretically challenging, but also of major importance to policymakers. Traditional deterrence theory, which is largely state-oriented, but has also delved into the realm of ordinary criminality, has not been adequately prepared to deal with individual or non-state actors who seem "irrational" because of their high propensity for risk taking and cost bearing. The present article seeks to adapt the notions of deterrence and risk taking developed in the context of interstate relations to such actors, especially terrorist groups whose members engage in martyr-style operations. First, a brief, non-technical review of the essentials of the rational choice approach to deterrence is provided. Second, the article indicates how this approach can be adapted to the deterrence of terrorist actions, especially the crucial role of risk and its correlate, uncertainty, on decision making. Finally, by way of examples, it suggests how these theoretical findings can contribute to a better understanding of the deterrence of terrorists' actions. Perhaps the most important conclusion reached is that no policy is best, although some policies appear to be more efficacious than others. Although this is not an unexpected conclusion, the present analysis puts it on a firmer theoretical foundation and reinforces the argument that the focus of debate, discussion, and policy should be on the prospects for containing or reducing terrorist actions via passive defenses and the denial to terrorists of access to potential targets.While bypassing the question of what might be "terribly wrong," the question of how to deter high cost and risk bearing terrorists, especially those who seek "martyrdom" in the conduct of attacks, is not only theoretically challenging, but also of major importance to policymakers. Although scholars agree that terrorists are rational in the senses that they pursue clear (in their own minds) goals and that their behaviors generally alter in expected ways in response to changes in the costs, risks, and probabilities, which are associated with different actions, traditional deterrence theory, which has been largely state-oriented (i.e., Realist and Cold War based) or focused on ordinary criminality, has been poorly equipped to deal with actors who appear to be irrational because of their high propensity for risk taking and extreme cost acceptance up to and including suicide. The present article seeks to explore the terrorist mindset through the examination of terrorists' goals, motivations, decision processes, risk taking, and the prospects for deterrence of them. The primary concerns revolve around the following questions: Psychologically, what does the emergent terrorist bring to a putative decision situation before any specific actions are contemplated? How might analysts and policymakers better understand, explain, and possibly predict actions and non-actions in these situations? In other words, how might terrorists be eff...

Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security

“…For example, in many analyses, terrorists are presumed to have perfect information about their probabilities of succeeding against security measures of known effectiveness. Notable exceptions we identified were Dutter and Seliktar (2007), who address uncertainty in their theoretical discussion of terrorism deterrence; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983), who include outcome uncertainty for the terrorist as an element of a game-theoretic examination of the setting of demands in terrorist negotiation; and Anthony (2003), whose consideration of terrorist uncertainty about defensive measures-and steps attackers might take to reduce that uncertainty-is central to his discussion of the effectiveness of deterrence. Recent work by Zhuang and colleagues Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2009) has included the topics of uncertainty and incomplete information, but these treatments have focused on deception and secrecy-i.e., uncertainty intentionally created by security actors-rather than the inherent uncertainties faced by terrorist decisionmakers.…”

Moving Beyond Our Comfort Zone: Global Leadership in Hostile Environments

“…Individual factors are characteristics of a group's members that influence DM through their impact on the group's structure and collective attributes. Other influential factors include attitudes toward risk (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007), emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), commitment (della Porta, 1992), cognitive biases, and personality traits (Crenshaw, 2000). Another example is group members' past experiences (Post, Ruby, & Shaw, 2002).…”

“…Individuals' previous experience with violence, for instance, can impact group processes by pushing the group toward violent, as opposed to nonviolent, behaviors. Other influential factors include attitudes toward risk (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007), emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), commitment (della Porta, 1992, cognitive biases, and personality traits (Crenshaw, 2000). Although it may not be feasible for global leaders to become familiar with every characteristic of every group member, simply being aware of their influence can help them better understand the behaviors of such members and can make them aware of important social cues upon interacting with them.…”

“…Similarly, just as the presence of opponents or government restrictions can influence decisions, so too can the presence of constituents or supporters. Both opponents' (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007) and supporters' resources can also feed into the DM process. Other examples include societal norms, political structure, and local political, economic, and social instability.…”