To Sequestrate or not to Sequestrate in View of the National Credit. Act 34 of 2005: A Tale of Two Judgments

Boraine, Andre; Heerden, Corlia van

doi:10.17159/1727-3781/2010/v13i3a2676

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…67 Boraine and Van Heerden thus contend that the parties should be able to reclaim at least some of what they have performed. 68 In this respect, Sonnekus has also argued that the credit provider should have a claim in unjustified enrichment against the consumer. 69 Further below, I make a suggestion based on constitutional property law.…”

Section: Uncertainty Twomentioning

confidence: 99%

The National Credit Act's remedies for reckless credit in the mortgage context

Brits

2018

PER

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The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 prohibits the granting of reckless credit and also provides for certain remedies that courts can grant to consumers who have fallen victim to reckless lending practices. Depending on the circumstances, these remedies are the partial or full setting aside of the consumer's rights and obligations under the agreement; the temporary suspension of the effect of the agreement; and the restructuring of the consumer's obligations. This article investigates these remedies with a focus on the effect that they would have on a credit provider under a mortgage agreement. The argument is made that the contractual and security rights of credit providers amount to "property" for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of |South Africa, 1996 (the property clause) and that, to some degree or another, each of these remedies involves a "deprivation" (limitation or modification) of the creditor provider's rights (property). The consequence is that, when one of these remedies is granted to a consumer, the court must tailor the remedy in such a way that the effect on the credit provider is not "arbitrary" as meant in the property clause. Therefore, the proposal is that there must be a sufficient relationship between the purpose of the remedy (to discourage reckless lending and to rectify the damage caused) and the effects thereof on the credit provider. In general, the remedy should not go further than is necessary to rectify the prejudice suffered by the consumer due to the credit provider's conduct. The formulation of the remedy should accommodate considerations such as whether and to what extent either or both parties have already performed under the agreement, and it should accordingly ensure that the consumer will not be unjustifiably enriched. The remedy should also account for the effect that it would have if the consumer is permitted to keep the property that was subject to the reckless credit agreement. The article furthermore raises doubts regarding the recent high court judgment in ABSA v De Beer 2016 3 SA 432 (GP), where all the consumer's rights and obligations under a mortgage agreement were set aside due to the credit provider's reckless conduct. Remedies like this have serious consequences and therefore it is imperative that courts carefully investigate all the effects that the order would have, so that a just and reasonable outcome is achieved. This article accordingly aims to provide some guidance with reference to the principles of constitutional property law.

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Section: Uncertainty Twomentioning

confidence: 99%

The National Credit Act's remedies for reckless credit in the mortgage context

Brits

2018

PER

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“…The process of sequestration can be initiated either by the debtor self, termed ‘voluntary surrender of the debtor's estate’, or by a creditor of the debtor, termed ‘compulsory sequestration’, but necessitates court involvement in all instances . The commencement of sequestration proceedings has the effect of initiating a stay of proceedings on civil collection of debts…”

Section: Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

Various Aspects to Consider with Regard to Special Insolvency Rules for Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises in South Africa

Boraine

Wyk

2015

Intl Insolvency Rev

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The notion of special insolvency rules for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has attracted attention in international spheres, and within the ambit of some international and comparative approaches, same is considered in this article with particular focus on the South African position. In particular, we show that the South African insolvency regime does not, at present, cater for financially distressed small businesses in a specific and viable manner. In South Africa, although attention has been paid to the development and support of small businesses, similar considerations have not been observed with regard to the insolvency side of small business concerns. No comprehensive and focused process of dealing with financially distressed small businesses exists in the South African insolvency framework. This scenario prevails, notwithstanding that there are existing foreign and international policy guidelines, rules and regimes in developed jurisdictions that can serve as pointers in this regard. The purpose of this article is to first highlight the need for special treatment of small businesses by focusing on the shortcomings in the South African system, and, as a natural sequential development, policy proposals as unavoidable foundations to address these shortcomings. In the premises, the focus is on the principles and policies that are relevant to any discussion regarding insolvent businesses that fall within the scope of the SME category. Therefore, this paper deals with the concept of the small business, the South African insolvency regime and the international position pertaining to small businesses. In particular, the need for special treatment of SMEs under insolvent circumstances is discussed, consideration is given to the existing South African mechanisms available to small businesses in distress and the lack of suitable contextual provisions for small businesses in distress is noted. A core component of this article is the position in South Africa viewed against the backdrop of some international developments, international documents and principles that are relevant to an insolvency and rescue/rehabilitation regime within the context of the small business. As a logical conclusion, recommendations for reform of the South African regime are made.

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Sink or Swim? Debt Review's Ambivalent "Lifeline" ... a Second Sequel to "… A Tale of Two Judgments" Nedbank v Andrews (240/2011) 2011 ZAECPEHC 29 (10 May 2011); Firstrand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 4 SA 597 (KZD) and Firstrand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg 2012 2 All SA 186 (ECP)

Steyn

2017

PER

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The interface between the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 has been the object of our courts' attention in a number of recent cases including Ex parte Ford and Two Similar Cases 2009 3 SA 376 (WCC), Investec Bank Ltd v Mutemeri 2010 1 SA 265 (GSJ), Naidoo v ABSA Bank Ltd 2010 4 SA 597 (SCA) and, more recently, Nedbank v Andrews (240/2011) 2011 ZAECPEHC 29 (10 May 2011), FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 4 597 (KZD) and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg 2012 2 All SA 186 (ECP). The question raised in all of the three most recent cases was whether or not a debtor's application for debt review in terms of the National Credit Act constitutes an "act of insolvency" in terms of section 8 of the Insolvency Act, upon which a creditor may rely in an application for the compulsory sequestration of the debtor's estate. If it does, it would mean that by resorting to the debt relief measures provided by the National Credit Act a debtor commits the very act on which a creditor may base an application for a sequestration order which, if granted, will render the debtor's estate insolvent and bring about the liquidation of his assets. From the debtor's perspective, this is probably precisely the situation that he seeks to avert by applying for debt review. Further, sequestration would frustrate the stated purpose of the National Credit Act, which is that debtors should take responsibility for their debts by satisfying them in full. Concurrent creditors might also ultimately receive a dividend which falls far short of what is due to them.The question of whether a debtor's resorting to debt review may or should be the very act that triggers his estate's sequestration and its attendant consequences is an important issue, the treatment of which impacts significantly on the efficacy of the South African consumer debt relief system. This article analyses the most recent judgments and considers whether or not statutory regulation of the position is required.

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To Sequestrate or not to Sequestrate in View of the National Credit. Act 34 of 2005: A Tale of Two Judgments

Cited by 4 publications

References 4 publications

The National Credit Act's remedies for reckless credit in the mortgage context

The National Credit Act's remedies for reckless credit in the mortgage context

Various Aspects to Consider with Regard to Special Insolvency Rules for Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises in South Africa

Sink or Swim? Debt Review's Ambivalent "Lifeline" ... a Second Sequel to "… A Tale of Two Judgments" Nedbank v Andrews (240/2011) 2011 ZAECPEHC 29 (10 May 2011); Firstrand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 4 SA 597 (KZD) and Firstrand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg 2012 2 All SA 186 (ECP)

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