To Share or Not to Share: When Do Toddlers Respond to Another's Needs?

Brownell, Celia A.; Svetlova, Margarita; Nichols, Sara R.

doi:10.1080/15250000802569868

Cited by 247 publications

(257 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Other work shows that give-and-take games, but not mere modeling promote infant sharing [42]. Studies relying on different setups found that even noncostly sharing did not emerge before 25 months and required that the other verbalized her desire [43]. It seems therefore plausible to interpret these earliest instances of sharing as infants being either compliant with an adult's request or as infants perceiving the experimental set-up as part of a give-and-take game activity.…”

Section: A Multidimensional Approach To Early Prosocial Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

Paulus

2018

Current Opinion in Psychology

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A majority of current work indicates that the different types of prosocial behavior in young children (helping, sharing, comforting) are not related to each other. Here, I review recent studies that examined the relations between prosocial actions as well as the antecedents and correlates of the particular domains of prosociality. I argue that in addition to different social-cognitive demands also different motivations are involved in early prosocial action, and that prosociality is thus a concept that encompasses -at least early in development -heterogeneous behaviors and motivations.

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Section: A Multidimensional Approach To Early Prosocial Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

Paulus

2018

Current Opinion in Psychology

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“…Children chose randomly in the first two conditions (they received one sweet either way and did not much consider what their partner would get), and they chose the (2,0) allocation in the last condition, to maximize their own gain. Similarly, Brownell, Svetlova, and Nichols (2009) found that 2-year-olds who could share treats with an experimenter tended to choose randomly between a (1,1) and a (1,0) allocation, unless the experimenter explicitly expressed her desire for a treat. As might be expected given these results, investigations of infants' concern about fairness in the allocation of resources have relied mainly on third-party tasks (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 2011;Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011;Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012).…”

Section: Do Infants Expect Individuals To Allocate Resources Fairly?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Baillargeon¹,

Scott²,

He³

et al. 2015

APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 1: Attitudes and Social Cognition.

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IntroductionConsider the following scene: A man wearing a backpack is pacing leisurely back and forth in a large airport room. As he strolls, he occasionally crosses his arms, twirls the dangling straps of his backpack, or stuffs his hands in his pant pockets. At one point, he sits down, takes off his backpack, and removes from it a bag filled with assorted gummy bears; as he peers intently inside the bag, he selects and eats, one at a time, five red gummy bears.As adults, we would have no difficulty interpreting the man's actions. We might view his initial actions-pacing, crossing his arms, and so on-as intentional (as opposed to accidental) though not as directed toward any particular goal. In contrast, we might perceive his subsequent actions-removing the bag of gummy bears from his backpack and eating five red ones in succession-as both intentional and goal-directed. In analyzing these actions, we might build an explanation that attributes to the man a causally coherent set of motivational and epistemic mental states: He wants to eat gummy bears, he is particularly fond of red ones, and so when he spies one in the bag, he removes it and eats it.Next, consider a new scene: As the man is happily chewing on red gummy bears, he notices a second man approaching who is carrying two heavy suitcases. At this point, our scene might unfold according to different scenarios. In one, the first man greets the second man, offers to carry one of the suitcases, and holds out his bag of gummy bears. In another scenario, the first man continues to watch the second man but makes no move to approach him. In yet another scenario, the first man sticks out a leg to trip the second man, causing him to fall heavily.As adults, we would interpret and evaluate the first man's actions in the three scenarios very differently. In the first scenario, we might infer that the two men have a social group in common: They might be friends, coworkers, or relatives, for example. In the second scenario, we 3 would conclude that the two men are strangers. In both the first and second scenarios, we would view the first man's behavior as acceptable: Offering help and sharing food are expected prosocial behaviors in interactions with ingroup, but not outgroup, individuals. In contrast, the first man's behavior in the third scenario would seem to us beyond the pale: Unprovoked harmful actions, even against outgroup individuals, are generally viewed as unacceptable. We would categorize the first man as an antisocial lout, and we might file away distinctive characteristics as possible markers of a social group to be avoided in the future.Our discussion of the two scenes above illustrates the rich analyses that adults spontaneously engage in when watching others act. What are the developmental origins of these interpretations? Over the past 25 years, there has been a great deal of research on social cognition in infancy. This research can be roughly organized into two sets of questions that map neatly onto the two scenes above. First, when watching an agen...

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“…By 12 months of age, infants begin to provide helpful information to others [85], at 15 months they will share a toy with an unfamiliar adult [86], and by 18 months they are capable of providing instrumental help; that is, helping another achieve a goal [87]. Moving further into childhood, Brownell et al [88] presented 18-and 25-month-old infants with a task requiring them to pull one of two handles attached to a pair of trays in order to obtain a reward. Pulling one of the handles delivered a loaded tray to the child and to an adult confederate, whereas pulling the alternative handle delivered a loaded tray to the child only.…”

Section: Prosocialitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why developmental psychology is incomplete without comparative and cross-cultural perspectives

Nielsen

Haun

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

100

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One contribution of 16 to a theme issue 'Understanding self and other: from origins to disorders'. As a discipline, developmental psychology has a long history of relying on animal models and data collected among distinct cultural groups to enrich and inform theories of the ways social and cognitive processes unfold through the lifespan. However, approaches that draw together developmental, cross-cultural and comparative perspectives remain rare. The need for such an approach is reflected in the papers by Heyes (2015 Phil.

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To Share or Not to Share: When Do Toddlers Respond to Another's Needs?

Cited by 247 publications

References 41 publications

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

The multidimensional nature of early prosocial behavior: a motivational perspective

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Why developmental psychology is incomplete without comparative and cross-cultural perspectives

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