To Yield or Shield? Comparing International Public Administrations’ Responses to Member States’ Policy Contestation

Abstract

When member states contest policymaking in international organizations, some international public administrations (IPAs) react in a conciliatory way while others are adversarial. This article argues that IPAs' dependence on contesting states, their policymaking authority, and affectedness from contestation shape communicative responses. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 32 cases of contestation by the Trump administration indicates that IPAs yield when they are constrained by dependence on the United States or have no incentive to defend themselves. IPAs fend off contestation when they are unconstrained and incentivized by attacks on an international organizations's polity, the bureaucracy, or policies in whose making they were substantially involved.

Institutional design for a post-liberal order: why some international organizations live longer than others

“…Faced with external pressures, there are essentially two ways for IOs to respond (Heinkelmann-Wild and Jankauskas, 2020; Hirschmann, 2020). They can accommodate the external pressures and try to adjust to a changing international environment, or they can resist (or ignore) external pressures.…”

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“…Second, the dissertation problematizes the existing principalbiased perspective in delegation studies and the lack of attention to the actual behaviour of the agent. It demonstrates the limits of a state-centric view on IOs, highlighting the need to consider the characteristics of both member states and IPAs in relation to each other (Eckhard and Jankauskas, 2020;Heinkelmann-Wild and Jankauskas, 2020;Jankauskas, 2021;Jankauskas et al, 2021; see also Heinkelmann-Wild and Jankauskas, 2019;Jankauskas, 2019;Jankauskas and Eckhard, 2019). Third, the dissertation puts so far unquestioned, basic assumptions of P-A theory to an empirical test and develops theoretical and conceptual modifications thereof (Eckhard and Jankauskas, 2020;Heinkelmann-Wild and Jankauskas, 2020;Jankauskas, 2021;Jankauskas et al, 2021; see also Jankauskas, 2019).…”

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