Tolerância zero ou eficácia nula? Políticas públicas e regulamentos desportivos para combater o match-fixing

Abstract

Com recurso a entrevistas semiestruturadas e análise de conteúdo, este artigo avalia e expõe a ineficácia da política de “tolerância zero” da UEFA, órgão máximo do futebol europeu, em induzir compliance nos jogadores de futebol, em Portugal, ao nível das práticas de match-fixing. A ênfase excessiva na ética individual, a externalização do fenómeno como um problema do crime organizado e a relutância em admitir falhas de governança interna são as principais razões explicativas. O artigo afirma que a regulamentação do futebol deve passar de uma lógica de compliance para políticas de enforcement.

Fraud vulnerabilities in sport federations: the role of culture, leadership, and control

“…It is up to federations and SGBs to rethink how structural changes could counter an array of problems, including -in line with Cima and Moriconi (2022) -opportunity structures to exploit sports from outside and within.…”

“…Whilst this being a reality substantiated by numerous cases in sports worldwide, e.g. : crime syndicates operating within Pakistani and Indian cricket (Qureshi & Verma, 2013), Ugandan, Italian, Brazilian and Belgian football (Costa, 2018;Marchetti et al, 2021;Richard, 2013;Visschers et al, 2020), US boxing (Brooks et al, 2013) and more, SGBs often attribute fraud to external causes rather than assessing their own position when fraud occurs (Cima & Moriconi, 2022;Moriconi & Cima, 2020).…”

“…The abovementioned symptoms can also be observed within preventive anti-fraud strategies of SGBs. An example is UEFA's 'zero tolerance for match-fixing' policy, drawing from the 3R principle: recognize match-fixing, resist incentives, and report (Cima & Moriconi, 2022). The main issue with the 3R strategy is that it reduces match-fixing to a problem of individual morality (Moriconi & Cima, 2020).…”

“…The main issue with the 3R strategy is that it reduces match-fixing to a problem of individual morality (Moriconi & Cima, 2020). Such symbolic action -integrity washing -with limited practical implications drive SGBs further away from any type of accountability for systemic failures and poor governance that facilitate fraud (Andreff, 2019;Cima & Moriconi, 2022;Numerato & Baglioni, 2012;Verschuuren, 2021). Nonetheless, nuance is needed.…”

“…Drawing from the Organizational Fraud Triangle (OFT) (Free, 2015), this research digs into three commercialized sports characterized by high levels of commercialization, globalization, mediatization and profitability (Beech & Chadwick, 2013). The three OFT pillarsorganizational culture, leadership and management controls -are documented in sports (Bayley & Egle, 2021;Burton et al, 2017;Cima & Moriconi, 2022;Constandt et al, 2018Constandt et al, , 2019Maitland et al, 2015;Ondráčková & Verschuuren, 2021). Yet, no research considers the relation between the three OFT components simultaneously and their influence on vulnerabilities within the context of sport federations.…”