2017
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1584-8
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Tolerant reasoning: nontransitive or nonmonotonic?

Abstract: The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare the two 123Synthese approach… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…I believe that such semantic analysis would allow me to come up with another paper devoted to an adequate syntactic axiomatization of ≈. For this purpose, I employ Douven's analysis of a similar probabilistic entailment (Douven, 2014) as well as the shopper's guide by Hlobil to choosing your nonmonotonic logic (Hlobil, 2018) and Cobreros et al's entailments for tolerant reasoning (Cobreros & Egré & Ripley, 2021).…”
Section: Classifying ≈mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I believe that such semantic analysis would allow me to come up with another paper devoted to an adequate syntactic axiomatization of ≈. For this purpose, I employ Douven's analysis of a similar probabilistic entailment (Douven, 2014) as well as the shopper's guide by Hlobil to choosing your nonmonotonic logic (Hlobil, 2018) and Cobreros et al's entailments for tolerant reasoning (Cobreros & Egré & Ripley, 2021).…”
Section: Classifying ≈mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Again, this should not be interpreted as saying that there might be no approach, similar to Ripley's, which might reject Weakening on reasonable grounds. In fact, Ripley himself and his collaborators discussed alternatives of this sort in Cobreros et al (2017). However, such proposals do not motivate the rejection of Weakening in the plausibility of the addition of further assertions and denials taking an out of bounds positions, back into the bounds.…”
Section: Bilateralism and Classical Logicmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Independently of these results, philosophical work in logic has been produced arguing that long-standing paradoxes of vagueness and of truth can be solved by an appeal to substructural logics (see the recent special issue of Synthese on substructural approaches to paradox, [76]). Several authors have proposed that the key to solving semantic paradoxes (such as the Liar, or the Curry, or the sorites paradox), is by giving up some of the structural rules, including Transitivity [12,55,56,69,71,74], Reflexivity [25,44], Weakening [15,16,39], or Contraction [38,61,75]. Figure 1 gives an illustration of these various possible strategies by considering the following example, borrowed from [25], of a derivation of the Liar paradox in classical logic (the sentence λ is the Liar sentence, saying of itself that it is not true, ¬T λ ; the rules T -R and T -L express the intersubstitivity of φ with T φ ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%