Tomasello's tin man of moral obligation needs a heart

Carpendale, Jeremy I. M.; Lewis, C. S.

doi:10.1017/s0140525x19002462

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…He explains the second step as involving an extension to the collective resulting through social pressure experienced from the internalized “we.” In essence, this is conformity rather than morality. Although conformity is a part of human life, we suggest that this is an incomplete account of morality ( Carpendale and Lewis, 2020 ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Concern for others and their dignity is embedded in the pragmatics of conversation and politeness ( Brown and Levinson, 1987 ; Turnbull, 2003 ). The care and concern for others that structures our interaction is also a foundation for the development of moral obligation ( Carpendale, 2018 ; Carpendale and Lewis, 2020 ). Language is based on moral aspects of interaction and enables further complexity in morality through understanding and coordinating with others’ perspectives.…”

Section: A Process-relational Approach To Moral Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is a social process which begins with caring for others in close relationships and can then be extended to engaging with and respecting other perspectives on a societal level. Such a process, originally rooted in close interpersonal relationships, provides one means for moral progress as more perspectives become coordinated at a societal level ( Mead, 1934 ; Carpendale and Lewis, 2020 , 2021 ). This progress could extend beyond the initial circle of close relationships to include more perspectives within one’s culture and beyond, and could also be extended to other species and the broader biosphere 4 .…”

Section: A Process-relational Approach To Moral Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conceptualizations of Knowledge in Structuring Approaches to Moral Development: A Process-Relational Approach

2021

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Like other aspects of child development, views of the nature and development of morality depend on philosophical assumptions or worldviews presupposed by researchers. We analyze assumptions regarding knowledge linked to two contrasting worldviews: Cartesian-split-mechanistic and process-relational. We examine the implications of these worldviews for approaches to moral development, including relations between morality and social outcomes, and the concepts of information, meaning, interaction and computation. It is crucial to understand how researchers view these interrelated concepts in order to understand approaches to moral development. Within the Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview, knowledge is viewed as representation and meaning is mechanistic and fixed. Both nativism and empiricism are based in this worldview, differing in whether the source of representations is assumed to be primarily internal or external. Morality is assumed to pre-exist, either in the genome or the culture. We discuss problems with these conceptions and endorse the process-relational paradigm, according to which knowledge is constructed through interaction, and morality begins in activity as a process of coordinating perspectives, rather than the application of fixed rules. The contrast is between beginning with the mind or beginning with social activity in explaining the mind.

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confidence: 89%

Section: A Process-relational Approach To Moral Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Process-relational Approach To Moral Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conceptualizations of Knowledge in Structuring Approaches to Moral Development: A Process-Relational Approach

2021

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“…It is not something that has to be added later. Emotions, including interest and enjoyment, and curiosity are aspects of this interaction ( Carpendale and Lewis, 2020 , 2021 ).…”

Section: Prosocial Action Morality and Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, they are living in a world of addressing and being addressed, of mutual responsiveness, tied up in a caring relationship that is infused with strong emotions of concern, interest, and enjoyment. In such a developmental system, infants become persons when they are treated as persons ( Carpendale and Lewis, 2020 , 2021 ). It is through treating, or failing to treat, others as a person that infants learn the interpersonal consequences of their actions.…”

Section: A Process-relational Action-based Worldviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

From action to ethics: A process-relational approach to prosocial development

Carpendale

Wallbridge

2023

Front. Psychol.

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Explaining how children first become active prosocial and then later moral agents requires, we argue, beginning with action and interaction with others. We take a process-relational perspective and draw on developmental systems theory in arguing that infants cannot be born knowing about prosociality or morality or anything else. Instead, they are born with emerging abilities to act and react. Their biological embodiment links them to their environment and creates the social environment in which they develop. A clear distinction between biological and social levels cannot be made in the context of ongoing development because they are thoroughly interwoven in a bidirectional system in which they mutually create each other. We focus on infants’ emerging ability to interact and develop within a human developmental system, and prosociality and morality emerge at the level of interaction. Caring is a constitutive aspect of the forms of experience in which infants are embedded in the process of becoming persons. Infants are immersed in a world of mutual responsiveness within caring relationships that are infused with concern, interest, and enjoyment. In such a developmental system, infants become persons when they are treated as persons.

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Caretakers of value: A theory of human personhood

Woodward

2024

The Philosophical Forum

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According to a traditional view, humans are superior to their non‐human terrestrial companions because they alone are “rational animals.” Although the traditional view is presupposed by our social and legal institutions, it has been called into question by modern science: Darwin himself claimed that humans differ in degree rather than in kind from animals, and recent discoveries in comparative animal cognition have seemed to confirm Darwin's assertion. Sustaining the traditional view in light of these discoveries calls out for a careful comparison of the human mind with its precursors, the vertebrate mind and the mammalian mind. Psychological capacities shared across the animal kingdom are repurposed in humans, rendering humans uniquely capable of rationality. To be rational is to respond appropriately to value. Humans as such are not rational animals, but have the potential to become rational animals. This potential marks a morally relevant difference in kind between humans and non‐human animals.

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Tomasello's tin man of moral obligation needs a heart

Cited by 3 publications

References 33 publications

Conceptualizations of Knowledge in Structuring Approaches to Moral Development: A Process-Relational Approach

Conceptualizations of Knowledge in Structuring Approaches to Moral Development: A Process-Relational Approach

From action to ethics: A process-relational approach to prosocial development

Caretakers of value: A theory of human personhood

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