Too big to fail, too powerful to jail? On the absence of criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown

Pontell, Henry N.; Black, William K.; Geis, Gilbert

doi:10.1007/s10611-013-9476-4

Cited by 134 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Some are too powerful to blame (Pontell et al, 2014). Status-related factors such as influential positions, upper-class family ties, and community roles often preclude perceptions of blameworthiness (Slyke and Bales, 2012).…”

Section: Blame Game Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

When private internal investigators turn against the whistleblower

Gottschalk

2017

International Journal of Police Science & Management

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The business of fraud examiners in private internal investigations is important to many auditing firms and law firms. They are hired by public and private organizations when there are suspicions of misconduct and financial crime. Suspicions are sometimes disclosed by whistleblowers who attempt to tell what they perceive as illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices. This article presents a case from the Norwegian police, where whistleblowers expressed concerns about overtime, use of private cars, and procurement of equipment for personal use. The main whistleblower was also the ombudsman in the organization, where he repeated his accusations and allegations so frequently that he ended up being the main subject in the private internal investigation. This study finds partly support for the blame game hypothesis.

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Section: Blame Game Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

When private internal investigators turn against the whistleblower

Gottschalk

2017

International Journal of Police Science & Management

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“…Pontell, Black, and Geis () point out that some are too powerful to blame. Status‐related factors such as influential positions, upper class family ties, and community roles often preclude perceptions of blameworthiness (Slyke & Bales, ).…”

Section: Blame Game Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Blame game in private investigation reports: The case of Deloitte examination at Telenor VimpelCom

Gottschalk

2017

Journal Invest Psychology

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Business and public organisations hire fraud examiners to conduct private investigations when there is suspicion of misconduct or financial crime. Fraud examiners carry out their investigation based on a mandate. Often, individuals in the organisation are suspects. The blame game hypothesis is concerned with factors that cause blame attribution to some individuals but not to others. In this case study, only executives were blamed who had not disclosed corruption information to a major shareholder and to the chief executive officer.

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“…For the discipline of criminology as a whole, of course, this relative silence might be expected. As Pontell, Black and Geis () have recently put it: ‘Not surprisingly, with its overwhelming emphasis on crimes of the relatively powerless, criminology generally failed the challenge of the Great Economic Meltdown’ (p.8). This coheres with numerous critiques of the seemingly inherent inabilities of criminology as constituted academically adequately to incorporate issues of corporate, state, or, indeed, mass crime and harm, not to be rehearsed here.…”

Section: Crisis What Crisis? Academic Business As Usualmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crisis, What Crisis? Regulation and the Academic Orthodoxy

Tombs

2015

Howard J Crim Justice

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What can criminology or socio‐legal studies tell us about the causes of the financial crisis – a failure of regulation, at the very least – or ways in which further such crises might be prevented, mitigated, responded to? The article begins by setting out the emergence and dimensions of the academic orthodoxy on regulation – a series of shared assumptions regarding feasible and desirable forms of regulation. Then it undertakes a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of work on regulation and the crisis to assess the extent to which this orthodoxy has been reassessed in the light of events since 2007.

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Too big to fail, too powerful to jail? On the absence of criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown

Cited by 134 publications

References 14 publications

When private internal investigators turn against the whistleblower

When private internal investigators turn against the whistleblower

Blame game in private investigation reports: The case of Deloitte examination at Telenor VimpelCom

Crisis, What Crisis? Regulation and the Academic Orthodoxy

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