Too Cool for School? Signaling and Countersignaling

Feltovich, Nick; Harbaugh, Rick; To, Ted

doi:10.2139/ssrn.272593

Cited by 32 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Hence, it seems sensible that high standards that lower the "safety" for high-ability students in low-ability classes may generate more effort and greater learning, as might high standards that increase the "risk" for low-ability students in high-ability classes. Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002) present theoretical results that are consistent with this story as well. In their study of "counter-signaling" behavior, they argue that high standards improve the achievement of students mismatched with the typical ability level of their peers.…”

supporting

confidence: 80%

Do high grading standards affect student performance?

Figlio

Lucas²

2004

Journal of Public Economics

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This paper explores the effects of high grading standards on student test performance in elementary school. While high standards have been advocated by policy-makers, business groups, and teacher unions, very little is known about their effects on outcomes. Most of the existing research on standards is theoretical, generally finding that standards have mixed effects on students. However, very little empirical work has to date been completed on this topic. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effects of grading standards, measured at the teacher level. Using an exceptionally rich set of data including every third, fourth, and fifth grader in a large school district over four years, we match students' test score gains and disciplinary problems to teacher-level grading standards. In models in which we control for student-level fixed effects, we find substantial evidence that higher grading standards benefit students, and that the magnitudes of these effects depend on the match between the student and the classroom. While dynamic selection and mean reversion complicate the estimated effects of grading standards, they tend to lead to understated effects of standards.

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supporting

confidence: 80%

Do high grading standards affect student performance?

Figlio

Lucas²

2004

Journal of Public Economics

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“…See, e.g.,Feltovich et al (2002).16 If the support of v is bounded, all individuals with strong preferences for donation may register in equilibrium. That would be the case also if individuals with strong preferences for donation derived a sufficiently large consumption value from registration or if they incurred sufficiently lower contemplation costs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric organ donation: A cross-country study

Abadie

2006

Journal of Health Economics

398

156

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In the U.S., Great Britain and in many other countries, the gap between the demand and the supply of human organs for transplantation is on the rise, despite the efforts of governments and health agencies to promote donor registration. In some countries of continental Europe, however, cadaveric organ procurement is based on the principle of presumed consent. Under presumed consent legislation, a deceased individual is classified as a potential donor in absence of explicit opposition to donation before death. This article analyzes the impact of presumed consent laws on donation rates. For this purpose, we construct a dataset on organ donation rates and potential factors affecting organ donation for 22 countries over a 10-year period. We find that while differences in other determinants of organ donation explain much of the variation in donation rates, after controlling for those determinants presumed consent legislation has a positive and sizeable effect on organ donation rates. We use the panel structure of our dataset to test and reject the hypothesis that unmeasured determinants of organ donation rates confound our empirical results.

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“…8 6 In this signaling literature, the acquisition alternative is not examined; IPO underpricing is a temporary sacrifice to attain a higher payoff in the future (e.g., in subsequent seasoned public offerings). 7 In a different vein, Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002) show that when an agent's aptitude is unobservable by others, the agent may choose to place less emphasis on education to bring out his confidence and signal his good quality. In our model, on the other hand, it is not an agent's initial organizational aptitude (which constitutes public information), but rather the outcome (good or bad) of organizational assistance that is unobservable by outsiders.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Venture Capital Be a Curse?

Kanatas¹,

Stefanadis²

2010

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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We show that partnering with venture capitalists may be a curse to entrepreneurs in that it reduces their profits in the commercialization phase. Agents rationally infer that a likely reason an entrepreneur who has received managerial assistance (from a venture capitalist) refrains from a lucrative IPO and instead opts for an acquisition may be the low quality of his technology (which is unfixable), rather than of his management (which may be fixable). This leads to lower acquisition prices and greater IPO underpricing. From a social welfare standpoint, venture capital services are under-utilized and technologies are under-commercialized.

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Too Cool for School? Signaling and Countersignaling

Cited by 32 publications

References 35 publications

Do high grading standards affect student performance?

Do high grading standards affect student performance?

The impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric organ donation: A cross-country study

Can Venture Capital Be a Curse?

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