Tools for Effective Regulation: Is “More” Always “Better”?

Abstract

Regulatory inspections and enforcement are seen by many as a key instrument to ensure the effectiveness of regulations – it is broadly assumed to be essential to have supervision and “deterrence” to promote compliance with rules, and thus achievement of regulatory outcomes. However, this presupposes that rules are indeed adequate for reaching outcomes, and that control is what drives compliance with rules. A different approach suggests that compliance is more complex and driven by a combination of factors (ethics, social conformity, procedural justice and legitimacy etc), that rules are imperfect, and that risk-focused, risk-proportionate “regulatory delivery” will achieve better results, more “effectiveness”. Considering a case study of occupational safety inspections and outcomes in Britain, France and Germany, we observe that higher numbers of inspections are not correlated with less fatal incidents, and that, on the contrary, the best outcomes are achieved in the country having the least inspection visits, the most risk-focused system, and the broadest approach to “regulatory delivery”, combining engagement with regulated industries, guidance, responsive and risk-proportionate enforcement, and risk-based, targeted inspections.

Why meta‐research matters to regulation and governance scholarship: An illustrative evidence synthesis of responsive regulation research

“…Regulators and their targets need to keep asking questions about what exactly responsive regulation implies, in their setting and in their applications. Fifth, and following on from all of the above, responsive regulation should ideally be introduced as part of a suite of regulatory reforms (Blanc 2018). Without additional staff training, transparent and accountable public procedures, and ongoing learning and improvement, it is unlikely that the real‐world application of responsive regulation will live up to its theoretical promises (Lehmann Nielsen 2006).…”

“…A recurring observation is that responsive regulation requires careful implementation. Street-level bureaucrats, in particular, need guidance documents, training, or both, to be able to deal with the increase in discretionary space that comes with responsive regulation, and specifically with the tit-for-tat strategy (Blanc 2018). If this is not done, there is a risk of inconsistency in enforcement (Mascini & van Wijk 2009), favoritism (Zhu & Chertow 2019), abuse of process (Lewis et al 2017), uneven application of the law (O'Neill 2018), or rule ambiguity (Quilter & McNamara 2015).…”

The re‐occurrence of violations in occupational safety and health administration inspections

“…1 These norms, often embedded in legal rules, can conflict with short-run profit maximization. Blanc (2018) has proposed one useful way of categorizing the "different foundations of compliance" in four groups:…”

“…1 These norms, often embedded in legal rules, can conflict with short‐run profit maximization. Blanc (2018) has proposed one useful way of categorizing the “different foundations of compliance” in four groups: “enabling conditions: knowledge and understanding of rules, financial and technical ability to comply without putting the business viability in jeopardy; economic incentives: deterrence (probability of detection primarily, amount of potential sanctions as a secondary aspect – and also risk of reputation loss), improved market position, or compliance investments resulting in higher productivity, reduced losses etc. ); social and cultural drivers: group conformity (other group members or models behave in a compliant way), group ethical values (ethical values aligned with the values of the regulation and/or posit legal compliance as an absolute good); legitimacy and interactions – individual psychological drivers: legitimacy of authorities (influenced by social and cultural drivers, but also directly by individual experience), procedural justice (or lack thereof) experienced in interactions with authorities, regulators.” …”

Corporatismo y coproducción en la lucha contra el empleo irregular: un estudio de caso

“…La segunda propuesta se centra en los aspectos organizativos que pueden determinar la eficacia de la inspección de trabajo (Blanc, 2018;Weill, 2018Weill, , 2014Weill, , 2011Hardy y Howe, 2015;Piore, 2011;Piore y Schrank, 2008). En este marco pueden situarse las investigaciones centrada en la comparación internacional del modelo latino (Francia, España, etc.)…”