2016
DOI: 10.19030/jabr.v32i2.9602
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Top Executives’ Pay For Long-Run Performance And Corporate Governance

Abstract: This study examines the possibility that the quality of corporate governance has effects on the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Building on the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance and corporate governance literature, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide high powered long-run incentives to CEOs, indicating CEO incentive contracts can be replaced by the role of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is no… Show more

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