2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01135.x
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Torn in translation: An ethnographic study of regulatory decision‐making in Turkey

Abstract: There is much literature on the diffusion and translation of regulatory agencies from the perspective of formal political models. Ethnographic research of regulation process is, however, much less common. This is even more evident with regards to the study of regulatory agencies established outside the “West.” This article analyzes the translation process of the Turkish tobacco regulatory agency, which was established in 2002, under commitments made to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Based … Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Single country and single sector case studies often emphasise the specificity of local variations of the regulatory state, an approach which resonates well with the stress on micro‐political sensitivity that this paper will develop in its main body. For example, Kayaalp's (2012) ethnographic exploration of regulatory reform in Turkey's tobacco industry emphasizes the multiplicity of actors that bear upon the trajectory of regulatory politics around a single agency, and the contingency and unpredictability of the process of institutional transplant. Interestingly, some very recent work on regulatory agencies in Turkey has taken the additional step of making a more general argument that in more illiberal national settings (referring briefly to Hungary, Russia, and Venezuela, but focusing largely on Turkey), even where the regulatory state took hold temporarily, a process of “de‐delegation” is now occurring that sees a return of centralization, executive discretion, and politicization of bureaucracy (Ozel 2012).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Single country and single sector case studies often emphasise the specificity of local variations of the regulatory state, an approach which resonates well with the stress on micro‐political sensitivity that this paper will develop in its main body. For example, Kayaalp's (2012) ethnographic exploration of regulatory reform in Turkey's tobacco industry emphasizes the multiplicity of actors that bear upon the trajectory of regulatory politics around a single agency, and the contingency and unpredictability of the process of institutional transplant. Interestingly, some very recent work on regulatory agencies in Turkey has taken the additional step of making a more general argument that in more illiberal national settings (referring briefly to Hungary, Russia, and Venezuela, but focusing largely on Turkey), even where the regulatory state took hold temporarily, a process of “de‐delegation” is now occurring that sees a return of centralization, executive discretion, and politicization of bureaucracy (Ozel 2012).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a diffusion Kayaalp (2012) approach seldom achieves its desired outcome of global institutional homogeneity, even with the existing global pervasiveness of regulatory models, because of the differences between that adopted global policy and the generated practice on the ground. When a transplant of the global model is adopted, it undergoes a process of translation and gains a different meaning from those inherent in that original model.…”
Section: Redirecting Analytical Focusmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…And it is at this level that agencies ended up with different institutional guarantees of independence in the telecommunications and electricity sectors. Recent studies of IRAs in Turkey and cross‐sector and cross‐time variations in their levels of independence suggest that this hypothesis may also capture the role that bureaucrats have played in regulatory reforms in other developing countries (Kayaalp 2012; Ozel 2012). Other pieces in this special issue of the journal, in turn, suggest that in Colombia and in India the relevant actor in this micro‐design process has been the judiciary not the bureaucracy (Thiruvengadam & Joshi 2012; Urueña 2012).…”
Section: Why Does the Ira For Telecommunications Have Stronger Guamentioning
confidence: 99%