Tournament decision theory

Podgorski, Abelard

doi:10.1111/nous.12353

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…This often suggested. But there are many Condorcet methods developed in voting theory that seem promising; see Podgorski (2022) for recent work along these lines. In an earlier version of this paper, available on my website, I suggest the 'beatpath' method (Schulze, 2011).…”

Section: Maximizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

Thomas

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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The asymmetry is the view in population ethics that, while we ought to avoid creating additional bad lives, there is no requirement to create additional good ones. The question is how to embed this intuitively compelling view in a more complete normative theory, and in particular one that treats uncertainty in a plausible way. While arguing against existing approaches, I present new and general principles for thinking about welfarist choice under uncertainty. Together, these reduce arbitrary choices to uncertainty‐free ones, regardless of how the latter should be made. I illustrate these principles by developing two theories of the asymmetry, reflecting different views about the non‐identity problem. In doing so, I clarify some other major choice‐points, presenting new arguments that creating additional good lives can justify (but not require) doing harm. Finally, I consider what the developed theories have to say about the importance of extinction risk and the long‐run future.

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Section: Maximizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

Thomas

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Despite their origins in social choice theory, tournament solutions have found applications in a wide range of areas including game theory (Fisher and Ryan 1995), webpage ranking (Brandt and Fischer 2007), dueling bandit problems (Ramamohan, Rajkumar, and Agarwal 2016), and philosophical decision theory (Podgorski 2020). As is the case for social choice theory in general, early studies of tournament solutions were primarily based on the axiomatic approach.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results

Brill

Schmidt-Kraepelin

Suksompong

2021

AAAI

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Tournament solutions are standard tools for identifying winners based on pairwise comparisons between competing alternatives. The recently studied notion of margin of victory (MoV) offers a general method for refining the winner set of any given tournament solution, thereby increasing the discriminative power of the solution. In this paper, we reveal a number of structural insights on the MoV by investigating fundamental properties such as monotonicity and consistency with respect to the covering relation. Furthermore, we provide experimental evidence on the extent to which the MoV notion refines winner sets in tournaments generated according to various stochastic models.

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“…Laslier and Laslier (2017) analyze when the limiting distributions of certain reinforcement learning models based on tournaments converge to the maximin solution. Podgorski's (2022) work provides an application of tournament games in decision theory. An example in evolutionary biology is the work by Grilli et al (2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

A generalized Hotelling–Downs model with asymmetric candidates

Nikram,

Balkenborg

2023

J Public Economic Theory

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We investigate an extension of the Hotelling–Downs model to the case where the preferences of the voters do not have to be single peaked. In the case where candidates only care about winning or losing, assuming that a voter elects each candidate symmetrically with equal probability when indifferent, previous works by Fisher and Ryan and by Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton have shown that the equilibrium outcome of the model is unique. Uniqueness also holds in the case where candidates care about the strength of their majority. Our paper shows that furthermore the equilibrium is unique for small asymmetries in voter's behavior but not necessarily for large ones. In particular, if voters always vote for the incumbent rather than a newcomer when indifferent, the equilibrium policy outcome may fail to be unique. Moreover, we provide a further sufficient condition for uniqueness. Namely, suppose all voters vote for a given candidate with the same probability when indifferent. Then, if there is a Nash equilibrium in completely mixed strategies between the candidates, it is the only Nash equilibrium.

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Tournament decision theory

Cited by 14 publications

References 27 publications

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results

A generalized Hotelling–Downs model with asymmetric candidates

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