Tournament outcomes and prosocial behaviour

Kidd, Michael P.; Nicholas, Aaron; Rai, Birendra

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.011

Cited by 15 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…Another angle is to look at really sure or tight outcomes, depending on the probabilities of winning. Although the theory predicts no di¤erence in these, Mellers et al (1997) and Kidd et al (2013) show that surprise enhances emotional reactions. Hence, it is informative to test whether the joy of winning is higher the lower the actual win probability of this player.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…The consequences of winning and of losing are the focus of some other papers: Bühren and Pleß ner (2014) show that winners are more likely to pay for actually getting a physical trophy, Kidd et al (2013) …nd that winning increases generosity, especially if winning comes unexpectedly, and Buser (forthcoming) shows that following a loss, players set a higher performance target for themselves. We also look at the consequences of winning or losing, with a special interest on the player's willingness to play the contest once more.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Who Pays to Win Again? The Joy of Winning in Contest Experiments

Herbst

2016

SSRN Journal

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In contest experiments, overbidding is a widely observed phenomenon. One common explanation for overbidding is that winning in itself yields utility, termed the joy of winning. However, the joy of winning is di¢ cult to observe and to quantify. This paper develops a novel, incentivized way to measure the individual-speci…c joy of winning as well as the frustration of losing in a Tullock lottery contest. We …nd that the willingness to pay for a restart of the contest di¤ers between winners and losers. Compared to a theoretical benchmark, winners are more satis…ed and overbid for restart of the contest, while losers are less satis…ed and underbid. Further, e¤ort levels are higher in the second contest, which can be explained by selection of high e¤ort types with a high joy of winning into the restarted contest.

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Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Pays to Win Again? The Joy of Winning in Contest Experiments

Herbst

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…Firstly, higher rankings imply an advantageous position and represent higher competence, which is likely experienced as a social reward in most societies [31–34]. This social reward process may well have a generally positive impact on mood (similar to ‘warm-glow’) [35, 36] which could in turn lead to alterations in subsequent behavior, such as higher contributions in the following PGG [35, 37, 38]. In a similar vein, the negative emotion experienced by low ranked status (e.g., frustration, sadness) could elicit less willingness to engage in social interactions [39, 40] and thus fewer cooperative decisions in the subsequent PGG.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social rank and social cooperation: Impact of social comparison processes on cooperative decision-making

Gong

Sanfey

2017

PLoS ONE

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Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize and judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of great importance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn potentially motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in detail how social comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect of social decision-making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and identifying means of maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public goods is of vital interest to society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading performance rankings on a reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions via a modified Public Goods Game (PGG). Findings revealed that individuals ranked highest tended to be more cooperative as compared to those who placed in the bottom rank. Interestingly, this effect was regardless of whether the comparison group members were the subsequent players in the PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with higher social orientation. In summary, the present research shows how different social comparison processes (assessed via social rankings) can operate in our daily interaction with others, demonstrating an important effect on cooperative behavior.

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“…The reference consumption basket might be based on her expectations before being asked to donate, thus deducting no donation; alternately, it may have anticipated a small probability of an ask, or it might immediately subtract the expected value of the conditional donation after the ask. For any of these the reference consumption is still less than the higher earnings w. 27 In "Tournament Outcomes and Prosocial Behaviour" Kidd et al (2013) participants take part in a real effort tournament followed by the opportunity to contribute to a set of well-known charities. The authors found that those who are higher ranked contribute more (after controlling for earnings) and argue that this is driven by the "positive affect experienced by the winners [.…”

Section: Affective State (Unanticipated) and Generositymentioning

confidence: 99%

Stochastic Income and Conditional Generosity

2015

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in Stochastic Income and Conditional GenerosityChristian Kellner, David Reinstein, and Gerhard Riener * October 2015 AbstractWe study how other-regarding behavior extends to environments with uncertain income and conditional commitments. Should fundraisers ask a banker to donate "if he earns a bonus" or wait and ask after the bonus is known? Standard EU theory predicts these are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models both predict a larger commitment before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In field and lab experiments, we allow people to donate from lottery winnings, varying whether they decide before or after learning the lottery's outcome. Males are more generous when making conditional donations before knowing the outcome, while females' donations are unaffected. Males also commit more in treatments where income is certain but the donation's collection is uncertain. This supports a signaling explanation: it is cheaper to commit to donate before the uncertainty is unresolved, thus a larger donation is required to maintain a positive image. This has implications for experimental methodology, for fundraisers, and for our understanding of pro-social behavior.

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Tournament outcomes and prosocial behaviour

Cited by 15 publications

References 50 publications

Who Pays to Win Again? The Joy of Winning in Contest Experiments

Who Pays to Win Again? The Joy of Winning in Contest Experiments

Social rank and social cooperation: Impact of social comparison processes on cooperative decision-making

Stochastic Income and Conditional Generosity

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