Toward a Bifurcated Theory of Emotional Deterrence

Abstract

Since Hobbes (1957 [1651] and Beccaria (1963 [1764]), scholars have theorized that the emotion of fear is critical for deterrence. Nevertheless, contemporary deterrence researchers have mostly overlooked the distinction between perceived sanction risk and fear of apprehension. Whereas perceived risk is a cognitive judgment, fear involves visceral feelings of anxiety or dread. Equally important, a theory explicating the influence of deterrence on both criminal propensity and situational offending has remained elusive. We develop a theoretical model in which perceived risk and fear are distinguished at both the general and situational levels. We test this theoretical model with data from a set of survey‐based experiments conducted in 2016 with a nationwide sample of adults (N = 965). We find that perceived risk and fear are empirically distinct and that perceived risk is positively related to fear at both the general and situational levels. Certain background and situational factors have indirect effects through perceived risk on fear. In turn, perceived risk has indirect effects through fear on both criminal propensity and situational intentions to offend. Fear's inclusion increases explanatory power for both criminal propensity and situational offending intentions. Fear is a stronger predictor than either self‐control or prior offending of situational intentions to offend.

Fight or flight: Integral emotions and violent intentions

“…After excluding cases with item nonresponse on key variables, the analytic sample was reduced to 804 (see table ). Our sample is highly consistent with that used in prior research with MTurk samples in terms of race, age, and education (e.g., Levay, Freese, & Druckman, ; Pickett et al., ; Shank, ). Our sample majority is younger, more educated, and contains a larger proportion of Whites compared with overall the U.S population.…”

“…Of central importance is the onset of integral emotions. Although in various studies, scholars have explored situations in which emotional experiences result from probabilistic estimates of specific outcomes (e.g., arrest; Pickett et al., ), our interest is in the direct impact of integral emotions on behavior, as well as in indirect impacts via deterrence perceptions. As Frijda (, p. 355) explained, emotions can lend to judgments of absoluteness: They “know no probabilities.…”

“…This nuanced understanding of the effects of integral emotions on criminal decisions adds to the growing literature on the malleability of risk perceptions. Recent study findings have highlighted how risk perceptions can be updated in a Bayesian‐like manner after experiences with crime and crime consequences (or lack thereof; Anwar & Loughran, ), influenced by individual characteristics (Pickett et al., ; van Gelder & de Vries, , ), shaped by situational heuristic reasoning and biases (Pogarsky et al., ; Thomas, Hamilton, & Loughran, ), and minimized or “reset” through advantageous behavioral strategies within the criminal opportunity (e.g., fleeing from police; Cherbonneau & Jacobs, ). In the current study, we build on this emergent line of inquiry by demonstrating how integral emotions potentially influence an individual's perceptions.…”

“…Developmental gaps between the prefrontal cortex and the socioemotional limbic system of the brain are likely associated with the frequency and incidence in which actors experience integral emotions across situations (Steinberg, ; Steinberg et al., ). Thus, developmental models including age‐graded and state‐dependent mechanisms described in decision‐making theories (e.g., appraisal theory and rational choice theory) would allow for researchers to parse out the interactive influence of individual and situational factors that simultaneously bound information processing and evoke momentary, affective inputs (e.g., see Wiers et al., p. 6; see also Pickett et al., ; Pogarsky et al., ; van Gelder & de Vries, , ). In this light, integral emotions can serve as an empirical nexus linking situational‐ and individual‐level risk factors (Felson, ; Warr, ).…”

“…We designed our theoretical approach to recognize that additional emotional dynamics are likely. For instance, Pickett, Roche, and Pogarsky () identified situations in which fear resulting from cognitive assessments of risk play an important role in deterrence (see also Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee,& Welch, ).…”