Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion

Hogan, William W.; Rosellón, Juan; Vogelsang, Ingo

doi:10.1007/s11149-010-9123-2

Cited by 90 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They consequently require more detailed study to prevent waiting games and free-rider type behaviour 12 . According to some authors (Hogan et al, 2010), all this new instrumentation will do nothing to improve coordination between the various transmission-system operators, often the cause of outages.…”

Section: Investing In Smart Gridsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives

2011

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The deployment of smart grids in electricity systems has given rise to much interdisciplinary research. The new technology is seen as an additional instrument available to States to achieve targets for promoting competition, increasing the safety of electricity systems and combating climate change. But the boom in smart grids also raises many economic questions. Public policies will need to be adapted, firstly to make allowance for the potential gains from smart grids and the associated information flow, and secondly to regulate the new networks and act as an incentive for investors. The new competitive offerings and end-user pricing systems will contribute to improving allocative and productive efficiency, while minimizing the risks of market power. With real-time data on output and consumption, generators

show abstract

Section: Investing In Smart Gridsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives

2011

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Multiple articles have determined the optimal regulation contract for stand-alone transmission companies (Nasser 1997;Léautier 2000;Vogelsang 2001;Hogan et al 2007). As customary in the regulation literature, it is helpful to separate Bayesian from nonBayesian regulatory contracts (see Vogelsang (2005) for a thoughtful discussion of the merits and applicability of both approaches).…”

Section: Optimal Regulatory Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Vogelsang (2001) acknowledges that this contract does not fully account for the specificities of the power grid. Finally, Hogan et al (2007) build on Vogelsang (2001) while better taking into account the laws of physics.…”

Section: Optimal Regulatory Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Optimal expansion of the power transmission grid: why not?

Léautier

Thelen

2009

J Regul Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…HR V regulation refers to[2]. It is an incentive price-cap mechanism over two-part transmission tariffs especially upgraded to deal with loop flows in meshed electricity networks 4 [3].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards optimal regulation of transmission network investment under renewable integration

Egerer

Rosellón

Schill

2013

2013 10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze regulatory regimes for electricity transmission investment in the context of transformation of the power system towards renewable energy. We study three distinctive developments of the generation mix with different implications on network congestion, which may be either of temporary or permanent nature. We address the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory price-cap mechanism, a cost-based rule, and a non-regulated approach in these three dynamic generation settings. We find that incentive regulation with Laspeyres weights may lead to overinvestment (stranded investment) as compared to the welfare optimum benchmark. Using Paasche weights leads to acceptable results only in a case of permanent exogenous congestion increase; in contrast, if (quasi) ideal weights are used, it is possible to restore the beneficial properties that incentive regulatory mechanisms are known for in static settings. This analysis motivates further research aimed to characterize optimal regulation for transmission expansion under a transforming renewable-based energy system.

show abstract

Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion

Abstract: Electricity transmission, Financial transmission rights, Incentive regulation, Loop-flow problem, D24, L51, L94,

Cited by 90 publications

References 33 publications

Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives

Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives

Optimal expansion of the power transmission grid: why not?

Towards optimal regulation of transmission network investment under renewable integration

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About