1993
DOI: 10.2307/2215755
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Toward A Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will

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Cited by 146 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…(C. A. Campbell 1967, John Thorp 1980, Alan Donagan 1987, Randolph Clarke 1993, and Timothy O'Connor 1993, 2000 explicitly take this view, while Chisholm vacillates in his early essays. Taylor, as already Suppose the agent's internal states to have objective tendencies of some determinate measure to cause certain volitional or actional outcomes.…”
Section: From the Conflict Between A Causal Theory And Freedom Of Actionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…(C. A. Campbell 1967, John Thorp 1980, Alan Donagan 1987, Randolph Clarke 1993, and Timothy O'Connor 1993, 2000 explicitly take this view, while Chisholm vacillates in his early essays. Taylor, as already Suppose the agent's internal states to have objective tendencies of some determinate measure to cause certain volitional or actional outcomes.…”
Section: From the Conflict Between A Causal Theory And Freedom Of Actionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(C.A. Campbell 1967, John Thorp 1980, Alan Donagan 1987, Randolph Clarke 1993, and Timothy O'Connor 1993, 2000 explicitly take this view, while Chisholm vacillates in his early essays. Taylor, as already noted, propounded agent causation as a feature of all intentional action, as does Godfrey Vesey 1987, William Rowe 1991, and Richard Swinburne 1997 Indeed, it may be that while some of our actions are agent-causal in character, others (including habitual and compulsive behaviors) are not.…”
Section: From the Conflict Between A Causal Theory And Freedom Of Actionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In our terms this is to say that among the causes of any event will be triggering as well as structuring causes and that the triggering causes will be events. 22 See [1], especially p. 194, where Randolph Clarke states and addresses what he calls the "rational-explicability objection." He does not employ the terminology of structuring and triggering causes, but we think their use in the statement of his position does not distort his view in any way.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It assumes a form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) strong enough to imply that every contingency has an explanation, 1 and it concludes that a necessity is required to account for all the contingencies. The argument, in other words, concludes that the totality of contingencies must have an explanation whose explanans L 1 ,...,L n includes at least one necessity.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This implies that the neural matters underlying the exercise of our agency don't conform to deterministic laws, but it doesn't appear to exclude the possibility that they conform to statistical laws (cf. Clarke 1993Clarke , 2003O'Connor 2000O'Connor , 2008. However, Derk Pereboom (1995; has argued that, if these neural matters conform to either statistical or deterministic physical laws, the complete conformity of an irreducible agent's settling of matters with what should be expected given the applicable laws would involve coincidences too wild to be credible (Pereboom 2001, 85).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%