Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly

Abstract

There is widespread recognition of a democratic deficit in global governance. While recognizing this deficit is easy, remedying it is going to be hard. Many existing proposals for global democratization are not very imaginative in that they begin from the assumption that the model for global democracy already exists in something like the form already taken by developed liberal democracies. One of the more prominent such models is the ‘popularly elected global assembly’ or PEGA. We accept the basic justifications for global democracy advanced by PEGA campaigners, but believe there is a need to move beyond facile invocations of electoral democracy at the global level. We examine the contribution to the development of global deliberative democracy that could be made by Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assemblies of ordinary citizens drawn from all the countries of the world. Such assemblies would be both deliberative and composed of ordinary citizens of the world – not elected politicians. We do not proclaim this kind of innovation as the solution to the problem of effective and democratically legitimate global governance. Rather, we call for its exploration as a complement to existing international institutions and a focal point for global deliberative systems. Policy Implications Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assemblies constitute an institutional alternative to prominent proposals for a Popularly Elected Global Assembly. A DGCA would provide novel and potentially substantial contributions to accountability, legitimacy and deliberative quality in global governance. A DGCA could help remedy the global democratic deficit, giving a voice to ordinary people. A DGCA could serve as an institutional focal point to make international interactions in general more deliberative and inclusive, and so more democratically defensible. A DGCA would not have to be a general‐purpose quasi‐legislative body. Assemblies could be issue specific and advisory.

Anticipating Transnational Publics

“…The issue of likely resistance to minipublics from governments or other transnational actors has been discussed by others, but another important dimension is the reaction to such bodies by members of national publics. 81 MacKenzie and Warren suggest that nonparticipating publics sometimes have reasons to trust a mini-public as a kind of information proxy that can guide their thinking on certain policy issues. 82 The representativeness of the mini-public is an important cue that enables nonparticipants to develop this trust, but this cue comes less readily in transnational contexts where representative claims are subject to contestation by various actors in a deliberative system.…”

Designing institutions for global democracy: flexibility through escape clauses and sunset provisions

“…They contend that the United States and China, as we have seen at the COP15 Climate Summit in late 2009, are disinclined to yield power or sovereignty to a transnational legal body. 72 However, Dryzek et al maintain that the United States, along with China and other authoritarian states, would be ameliorated by a DGCA. The random selection and deliberative nature makes a DGCA less objectionable to the national leaders because it poses less of a direct threat to established political structures and hence entails less sovereignty costs.…”

“…68 Their proposal is fairly simple: global democracy should commence through a deliberative forum, namely a DGCA. Such a body could be quite extensive or issue specific.…”

“…69 It would operate in the sphere of communicative action and help propel a deliberative system at the global level. 70 For deliberative democrats, political legitimacy is generated to the extent that those subject to a collective decision have the right, capacity, and opportunity to participate in consequential deliberation over the outcomes.…”

Slow theory: taking time over transnational democratic representation

“…Arguably, the question has special pertinence today for 'global' or transnational disputes, with their relative absence of familiar institutions of representative democracy and their anchoring effect on the dynamic play of representative claims and practices. 1 Consider, for example, the myriad claims at play at the UN Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen*from national governments, transnational governance bodies, pressure groups, business and scientific organisations, activists, and so on*asserting their right or capability to speak for people, animals, flora, and planet.…”