Toward a Projectivist Account of Color

Averill, Edward Wilson

doi:10.5840/jphil2005102525

Cited by 17 publications

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“…We now turn to projectivism (Averill, 2005;Boghossian & Velleman, 1989). Given the objectivist distinction between colors and p-colors, above, we can formulate projectivism's first claim as follows: P1: the property of being red is identical to the property of being p-red, i.e., the qualitative, sensuous, and intrinsic property that paradigm red objects look like they have when viewed in normal conditions.…”

Section: Projectivismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Color objectivism and color projectivism

Averill

Hazlett

2011

Philosophical Psychology

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Section: Projectivismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Color objectivism and color projectivism

Averill

Hazlett

2011

Philosophical Psychology

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“…We see surfaces to be colored, but it has been argued that surfaces do not have color properties (e.g. Hardin , , Boghossian and Velleman , Averill , and Maund ). We see our environment to be populated by objects, but it has been argued that there really are no objects or at least not the kind of objects that we seem to see (e.g.…”

Section: The Relational Content Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defense of Perceptual Content

Schellenberg

2017

Philosophical Perspectives

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“…Eliminativism is a radical view that denies this typical assumption – in its most general form, it claims that colors are not actually instantiated by external entities (e.g., Hardin , chap. II; Strawson ; Boghossian and Velleman ; ; Maund ; Averill ; Chalmers ; Pautz ). We can understand eliminativism as a pessimistic reaction to the fact that no conservative theory of color straightforwardly meets all the desiderata.…”

Section: Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the face of it, mentalism is phenomenologically inadequate – colors seem to be out there , not in our minds. However, a mentalist can circumvent this objection by adopting projectivism (Boghossian and Velleman ; Strawson ; Averill ); that is, by claiming that our minds somehow ‘project’ colors onto external entities (for example, by falsely representing such things as having colors) . Although mentalism flies in the face of common sense, it has a venerable history going as far back as Democritus, and enjoyed the sympathy of more recent historical figures such as Price, Moore, and Russell (according to Cohen , 15, fn.…”

Section: Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color

Logue

2016

Philosophy Compass

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This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory.This entry continues where 'Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color' left off. In that companion entry, I outlined physicalism about color -the view that color properties are identical to certain kinds of physical properties (e.g., surface spectral ref lectances). I evaluated physicalism with respect to the following desiderata on a metaphysics of color:• Structural desiderata: a metaphysics of color must accommodate certain structural claims about the colors (e.g., claims about similarities and differences). • The commonality desideratum: a color property must be identified with a (non-disjunctive)property that all things with that color have in common. • The ecumenism desideratum: color experiences of the same thing that vary across subjects and circumstances in certain ways are all veridical.As I said in the companion entry, physicalism can be regarded as a conservative theory of color, in the sense that it identifies colors with properties that all parties to the debate agree are actually instantiated by entities that appear to be colored. One of physicalism's main rivals, relationalism, is also a conservative theory. It holds that colors are properties that involve relations to psychological states of perceivers (such as being disposed to cause experiences of a certain kind). However, some have felt compelled to embrace radical theories, on which color properties are not identical to properties that pretty much everyone agrees are actually instantiated by entities that appear to be colored. Primitivism holds that colors are sui generis properties, over and above the physical and relational properties just mentioned, and eliminativism holds that external entities aren't actually colored after all. In this entry, I will outline and evaluate these alternatives to physicalism with respect to the desiderata mentioned above, as well as the following:• The causal desideratum: colors are the causes of color experiences.• The revelation desideratum: the natures of the colors are revealed by our experiences of them.

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Toward a Projectivist Account of Color

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

Color objectivism and color projectivism

Color objectivism and color projectivism

In Defense of Perceptual Content

Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color

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