Toward a View of Citizenship and Lobbying

Anastasiadis, Stephanos

doi:10.1177/0007650313483495

Cited by 66 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…Other firms jointly manage their CSR and CPA by deciding to separate them deliberately. Anastasiadis (2013), for example, finds that European car manufacturers intentionally kept their CSR and political lobbying efforts at arm's length, and were hesitant to align their CSR and CPA with respect to environmental issues. He concludes that misalignment between CSR and CPA is dangerous for firms' ongoing legitimacy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Playing on Two Chessboards: Reputation Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA)

Hond

Rehbein

Bakker

et al. 2013

J Management Studies

269

214

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It has recently been argued that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 'political'. It has been neglected however, that firms also operate politically in a traditional sense, in seeking to secure favourable political conditions for their businesses. We argue that there are potential synergies between CSR and corporate political activity (CPA) that are often overlooked by firms and that recognition of these synergies will stimulate firms to align their CSR and CPA. We develop a conceptual model that specifies how various configurations of a firm's CSR and CPA -alignment, misalignment, and non-alignment -affect the firm's reputation beyond the separate reputation effects of CSR and CPA. This model has important implications for understanding how and why firms should pay attention to their CPA and CSR configurations, and thereby contributes to the broader issue of why firms should make sure that they are consistent in terms of responding to stakeholder concerns.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Playing on Two Chessboards: Reputation Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA)

Hond

Rehbein

Bakker

et al. 2013

J Management Studies

269

214

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This may result in regulatory capture, which refers to the "result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interest of the regulated industry, by the intent or action of the industry itself" [31] (p. 13). Regulatory capture also seems closely related to lobbying, or "activities undertaken with the aim of influencing legislative/regulatory processes and outcomes" [32] (p. 263). Lobbying is an important dimension of organizations' political engagement that can have positive or negative impacts on sustainability [33].…”

Section: Sustainability Governance As An Interplay Of Regulation and Self-regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governance for Sustainability: Patterns of Regulation and Self-Regulation in the German Wine Industry

Spraul

Höfert

2021

Sustainability

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To foster sustainability pursuits, regulation by state-imposed legislation is often crucial, but self-regulation by corporations, associations, and other non-state actors increasingly exerts pressures and provides incentives for sustainable practices. In order to shed more light on the complex interplay among sustainability regulations and self-regulation, this study focused on a highly regulated field: the German wine industry. Using a social network analysis, this study identified the most central actors (e.g., associations, regulatory institutions) that need to be addressed in order to ensure the enforcement of sustainability. By analyzing 15 semi-structured interviews with the key actors, we outlined their understanding of sustainability, and classified three distinctive governance patterns. These mixed methods and in-depth analyses revealed that self-regulation by associations plays a crucial role in terms of enhancing sustainability, but regulation remains an important trigger in this context. This article concludes with some lessons for regulation and self-regulation policies that can ensure sustainability within an organizational field.

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“…Through efforts of advocacy work, lobbyists mobilize resources to shape norms and beliefs that are relevant in their playing field, with the intention of obtaining political support [16]. While lobbying is challenging to define and measure [62,63], it generally refers to a variety of efforts such as providing information and financial incentives, to affect institutional decision making [45,59,64,65]. Not seldom, and this also applies to the sharing economy, actions of lobbying take place behind the scenes [58], though there is evidence of actions trickling down via the media to the public [3].…”

Section: The Framework Of 'Coevolution Of Institutional Entrepreneurship'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This bias may eventually reflect on the amount and quality of the news reporting. Challenges to measure lobbying, an often hidden activity [58,63,65], may further reinforce the bias. Of all institutional strategies, lobbying is the most sensitive and therefore more likely to be underreported in the analysis, despite regular media coverage.…”

Section: Further Implications and Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Strategies in the Ridesharing Economy: A Content Analysis Based on Uber’s Example

Distelmans

Scheerlinck²

2021

Sustainability

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Recently, scholars have paid growing attention to ridesharing economy firms’ institutional work to obtain legitimacy. More specifically, they have pinpointed the need for further research to better understand the actions of institutional entrepreneurs across geographical contexts. In this paper, we investigate Uber’s institutional strategies in the Brussels Capital Region from 2014 to 2020. Using the theoretical lens of institutional entrepreneurship, we apply content analysis of press media to analyse Uber in relation to authorities, incumbents, drivers and users. We also delve into the tactical aspects of Uber’s institutional work. The findings show that during the first years of operation, Uber predominantly used strategies of framing and lobbying. The company also made diverse articulations of theorization, collaboration, and negotiation. A more inductive reasoning reveals that market strategies also have a part in Uber’s institutional work. According to the findings, Uber’s quest for legitimacy in Brussels was not an unqualified success, due to conflicts and special interests complicating the market. We formulate recommendations on how actors may build a more sustainable market of ridesharing and provide some reflections on the theoretical framework.

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Toward a View of Citizenship and Lobbying

Cited by 66 publications

References 64 publications

Playing on Two Chessboards: Reputation Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA)

Playing on Two Chessboards: Reputation Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA)

Governance for Sustainability: Patterns of Regulation and Self-Regulation in the German Wine Industry

Institutional Strategies in the Ridesharing Economy: A Content Analysis Based on Uber’s Example

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