Toward Property Rights in Spectrum: The Difficult Policy Choices Ahead

Can We Incentivize Sensing in a Light-Handed Way?

“…8 We will assume that the utility of the cognitive user is the total time it is able to transmit, so sensing takes up valuable time. 9 Using the parameters defined thus far, we can establish a base utility U B , that does not yet include sanction terms:…”

“…The cycle repeats every primary time step. 9 We are assuming that the secondary gets utility even if there is some pollution caused by the primary's presence in the band. This is actually not a bad assumption.…”

“…Cooperative schemes with multiple radios participating in the sensing process can lower this overhead. Unfortunately, a network of radios working together to sense is difficult, if not impossible, to certify because the relevant operating conditions cannot all be tested at certification time [9]. We offer an alternative approach in this paper that allows simple certification by moving some of the enforcement requirements closer to the time of use.…”

Crime and Punishment for Cognitive Radios

“…Although a better understanding of the underlying physical environment has prompted criticism, [24], and legal scholars have weighed in on the realistic abilities of the courts, [25], the basic tenets of property rights in spectrum has changed little since Coase and de Vany. Matheson [26] gave a more precise model of spectrum division, including seven dimensions, adding transmitter height and two angles of arrival to de Vany's original four.…”

“…When Coase first proposed property rights, he adopted the concept that exclusion was an efficient Hatfield and Weiser [24] gave the first critique that this method of boundary definition may be difficult due to the nature of the physical medium. Radio waves do not propagate deterministically.…”