Toward securing the control plane of 5G mobile networks against DoS threats: Attack scenarios and promising solutions

Ettiane, Raja; Chaoub, Abdelaali; Elkouch, Rachid

doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2021.102943

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Such research includes securing MAC protocol and radio-control handshaking in the dynamic and sophisticated dynamic spectrum environment against the channel control against insider, credential-compromising, and dynamic jamming [17][18][19], against MAC injection and handshaking-manipulating threats [20,21], and against the threats on channel-stateinformation (CSI) feedback [22,23]. While these research use models are abstracted from the 5G protocol details and generally applicable to wireless communications, the threats apply to the concrete protocols of 5G NR RRC protocol standardized by 3GPP [24][25][26]. However, the research solutions for securing the specific 5G RRC protocol between the user and the base station have been lacking; rather, the 5G security research has focused on incorporating and implementing security on the backend core network beyond the base station, e.g., [27][28][29][30].…”

Section: Base Station Control Communication Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing UAV Flying Base Station for Mobile Networking: A Review

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A flying base station based on an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) uses its mobility to extend its connectivity coverage and improve its communication channel quality to achieve a greater communication rate and latency performances. While UAV flying base stations have been used in emergency events in 5G networking (sporadic and temporary), their use will significantly increase in 6G networking, as 6G expects reliable connectivity even in rural regions and requires high-performance communication channels and line-of-sight channels for millimeter wave (mmWave) communications. Securing the integrity and availability of the base station operations is critical because of the users’ increasing reliance on the connectivity provided by the base stations, e.g., the mobile user loses connectivity if the base station operation gets disrupted. This paper identifies the security issues and research gaps of flying base stations, focusing on their unique properties, while building on the existing research in wireless communications for stationary ground base stations and embedded control for UAV drones. More specifically, the flying base station’s user-dependent positioning, its battery-constrained power, and the dynamic and distributed operations cause vulnerabilities that are distinct from those in 5G and previous-generation mobile networking with stationary ground base stations. This paper reviews the relevant security research from the perspectives of communications (mobile computing, 5G networking, and distributed computing) and embedded/control systems (UAV vehicular positioning and battery control) and then identifies the security gaps and new issues emerging for flying base stations. Through this review paper, we inform readers of flying base station research, development, and standardization for future mobile and 6G networking.

show abstract

Section: Base Station Control Communication Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing UAV Flying Base Station for Mobile Networking: A Review

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Automated Generation of 5G Fine-Grained Threat Models: A Systematic Approach

Granata,

Rak,

Mallouli

2023

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Fifth-generation technology standard for broadband cellular networks, 5G, delivers a significant increase in data speeds and capacity, as well as new capabilities such as higher energy efficiency, lower latency, and the ability to connect a large number of devices. These advances come with a new set of security challenges, as 5G networks will be more complex and integrated with critical infrastructure than previous generations. In order to correctly address such challenges there is the need for fine-grained threat models, that collect a set of well-detailed threats, each of them clearly addressing a system component, taking into account how components are connected and interact with each other, the specific technology and/or the protocols are involved. A fine-grained threat model can be used to support the definition of a penetration testing plan or to identify and verify the effectiveness of technical countermeasures. This paper extends an existing automated threat modelling methodology focusing on 5G architecture and defines a process to build in a systematic way the catalogue of threats on which the technique relies. In order to obtain such results, we extended our modelling technique, in order to model 5G architectures, defined a process to extend our methodology to address additional domains and applied the approach to a concrete case study, applying our technique to a common 5G open-source architecture proposed by our industrial partner. The main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows(I) A technique to systematically produce an extension of our modelling technique and a threat catalogue for a specific Domain, (ii) A 5G systems threat catalogue, (iii) A 5G systems graph-based modelling technique. As an additional result, we validated our approach, applying our technique in a real context and involving industrial experts for the evaluation of the generated fine-grained threat model.

show abstract