Towards a biography of Toma Zivanovic

Abstract

Rad sadrži nove podatke o Tomi Živanoviću. Iako je on u Srbiji danas poznat kao naučnik svetskog glasa i žrtva komunističkog režima, o Živanoviću postoji i jedna usmena tradicija, koja ga pamti kao sebičnog, škrtog i svadljivog čoveka, moralno neispravnog i nespremnog da pomogne studentima. Rad kritički ispituje tu tradiciju i delimično je potvrđuje a delimično opovrgava. Živanović je patio od kompleksa inferiornosti, pa je u socijalnoj komunikaciji reagovao arogantno i agresivno. U mladosti je njegova socijalna integracija bila otežana, ali je kasnije ušao u najviše krugove jugoslovenskog društva, delom zahvaljujući supruzi. Njegovi rani radovi o tripartitnom sistemu krivičnog prava i sintetičkoj pravnoj filozofiji bili su dobro primljeni, a on sam je bio istaknut član međunarodnih udruženja za krivične nauke i učesnik svih značajnijih skupova iz te oblasti. Po dolasku komunista na vlast je penzionisan, ali je kao član Akademije nauka vodio istraživačke projekte i putovao u inostranstvo na studijske boravke i međunarodne kongrese. U teorijskom pogledu, u ovom periodu Živanović nije stvorio ništa novo. Naprotiv, postao je opsednut značajem sopstvenih ranijih doprinosa, koje je smatrao univerzalno primenljivim "otkrićima". Ova opsednutost je poljuljala njegov smisao za stvarnost, pa je sebe dva puta kandidovao za Nobelovu nagradu. Ocena Živanovićevog doprinosa pravnoj teoriji koja preovlađuje u domaćoj literaturi je preterana, mada nema sumnje da je između dva svetska rata on spadao među dvadesetak najuglednijih teoretičara prava u svetu.

Automotive factory ‘Crvena Zastava’: Yugoslav self-management socialism and challenges for national automobile industry

“…Furthermore, the oil crisis magnified Zastava's financial difficulties because it coincided with the repayments of loans taken for the production line of the Z 101 model. 57 If national and international forces hampered Zastava's management to achieve their ambitious goals, the workers' self-management also played a role in forging Zastava trajectory, and in doing so it displayed the inner contradiction of the Yugoslavian industrial development. In his role as 'collective self-management entrepreneur', Rakovic´(with involuntary irony) spells out the oxymoron as belonging to Yugoslavian industrial managers.…”

Making automobiles in Yugoslavia: Fiat technology in the Crvena Zastava Factory, 1954–1962

“…14 The 1953 agreement with the American manufacturer Willys-Overland for production of the Jeep model in Kragujevac was a step in that direction. 15 These well-known off-road army vehicles became popular in Yugoslavia in 1945 through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) programme. 16 However, after the assembly of a mere 162 Jeeps, further cooperation with the American company was abandoned because Willys-Overland demanded a profit share on each vehicle assembled in Yugoslavia.…”

“…This also necessitated the first expansion of the factory's workshops and the procurement of new machinery. 35 However, it seems that managing director Rakovic´and the state officials who supported him were well aware of the growing potential of the Yugoslav market and actively wanted to move in that direction. The 1950s establishment of an automotive Yugoslav industry was concomitant with an average growth of the national gross material product of 10.2 per cent per year between 1953 and 1957, one of the highest in the world at that time.…”

“…This, actually, was an admission of the necessity of the 'mass' or at least rapid motorisation of Yugoslavia, though envisaged with a different partner and possibly aimed at a more prestigious clientele. 40 After more than six months of negotiations and a lot more time spent on the preparation of the project, the construction of a completely new Crvena Zastava factory began in April 1960. The facility was finally opened in June 1962.…”

“…I will further investigate everyday exchanges between Crvena Zastava and its network of sub-contractors, and its impact on the development of the Yugoslav automobile industry. 6 My main argument is that, in spite of the nominally successful technology transfer from Fiat, the development of a truly modern Yugoslav automobile industry was hampered by national policies of self-management and 'ethnic key'. In my opinion, self-management and 'ethnic key' policies overburdened the country's budding automobile industry with bureaucratic inefficiency, a lack of clear and effective decision-making mechanisms at shop floor level or higher managerial echelons, as well as logistical problems in the supply chain.…”