Towards a Credible Theory of Gullibility

Krueger, Joachim I.; Vogrincic-Haselbacher, Claudia; Evans, Anthony M.

doi:10.4324/9780429203787-6

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…The present studies also build upon prior research examining gullibility and implausible beliefs. Analytic reasoning has been argued to reduce gullibility (Krueger et al, 2019); a conjecture that is consistent with the negative correlation between engagement in analytic reasoning and belief in fake news observed here. The present studies also interface with prior research through their suggestion that increased engagement in analytic reasoning may improve the ability to discriminate real from fake news.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

“…Haselbacher,& Evans, 2019); a conjecture that is consistent with the negative correlation Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172140Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172140…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

“…Analytic reasoning may sometimes override default responses suggested by intuitive processes, which are thought to emerge autonomously from simple stimulus-response pairings (Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Through this override process, engagement in analytic reasoning may reduce gullibility, and may therefore decrease endorsement of many intuitive-but-implausible beliefs, including those advanced via fake news (Krueger, Vogrincic-Haselbacher, & Evans, 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2018a, 2018b). In the general population, use of this override process may vary due to individual differences in general cognitive ability and in willingness to engage in analytic thinking (i.e., in the degree to which individuals have an “analytic cognitive style”; Frederick, 2005; Pennycook, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Stanovich & West, 2000).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Belief in fake news is associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced analytic thinking.

Bronstein¹,

Pennycook²,

Bear³

et al. 2019

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

155

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Delusion-prone individuals may be more likely to accept even delusion-irrelevant implausible ideas because of their tendency to engage in less analytic and actively open-minded thinking. Consistent with this suggestion, two online studies with over 900 participants demonstrated that although delusion-prone individuals were no more likely to believe true news headlines, they displayed an increased belief in "fake news" headlines, which often feature implausible content. Mediation analyses suggest that analytic cognitive style may partially explain these individuals' increased willingness to believe fake news. Exploratory analyses showed that dogmatic individuals and religious fundamentalists were also more likely to believe false (but not true) news, and that these relationships may be fully explained by analytic cognitive style. Our findings suggest that existing interventions that increase analytic and actively open-minded thinking might be leveraged to help reduce belief in fake news.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

mentioning

confidence: 79%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Belief in fake news is associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced analytic thinking.

Bronstein¹,

Pennycook²,

Bear³

et al. 2019

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

155

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, although we use the label gullibility throughout the manuscript, we provide participants with a broad definition of gullibility which encompasses the extent to which they believe a person is gullible, trusting, naïve, and easily believes others (Krueger et al, 2019;Schniter & Shields, 2020).…”

Section: Measuring Gullibility Impressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Can Be Fooled? Modeling Facial Impressions of Gullibility

Jaeger

Meral

2022

Social Cognition

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The success of acts of deceit and exploitation depends on how trusting and naïve (i.e., gullible) targets are. In three preregistered studies, using both theory-driven and data-driven approaches, we examined how people form impressions of gullibility based on targets' facial appearance. We find significant consensus in gullibility impressions, suggesting that people have a somewhat shared representation of what a gullible person looks like (Study 1, n = 294). Gullibility impressions is based on different cues than trustworthiness or dominance impressions, suggesting that they constitute dissociable facial stereotypes (Study 2, n = 403). Examining a wide range of facial features, we find that gullibility impressions are primarily based on resemblance to an angry facial expression. We also find that young, female, and smiling individuals were seen as more gullible (Study 3, n = 209). These findings suggest that gullibility impressions are based on cues linked to low levels of perceived threat.

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“…Given the lack of previous studies on gullibility and facial stereotypes, we adopt a relatively broad conceptualization of gullibility here. We define a gullible individuals as someone who is very trusting (rather than distrusting), who is very naïve (rather than skeptical), and who easily believes others (rather than is easily suspicious of others; Krueger, Vogrincic-Haselbacher, & Evans, 2019;Teunisse et al, 2019;Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999). The goals of the current investigation were threefold.…”

Section: Gullibility Impressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who can be fooled? Modeling facial impressions of gullibility

Jaeger¹,

Meral²

2020

Preprint

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In many situations, ranging from cooperative exchange to fraud, people are faced with the challenge to judge how trusting or naïve (i.e., gullible) others are. In three studies, using both theory-driven and data-driven methods, we examine how people form gullibility judgments based on a person’s facial appearance. People have a shared representation of what a gullible person looks like. Gullibility impressions are positively related to trustworthiness impressions, but negatively related to dominance impressions (Study 1, n = 254). Examining the influence of a wide range of facial characteristics, we find that gullibility impressions are based on cues that have been linked to low levels of perceived threat, such as babyfacedness (Study 2, n = 403) and smiles (Study 3, n = 209). Together, these findings show that people form gullibility judgments based on facial cues that are seen as indicators of relative harmlessness (i.e., positive intentions and low capabilities).

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Towards a Credible Theory of Gullibility

Cited by 7 publications

References 1 publication

Belief in fake news is associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced analytic thinking.

Belief in fake news is associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced analytic thinking.

Who Can Be Fooled? Modeling Facial Impressions of Gullibility

Who can be fooled? Modeling facial impressions of gullibility

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