Towards a Metric for Communication Network Vulnerability to Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Gueye, Assane; Marbukh, Vladimir; Walrand, Jean

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_20

Cited by 21 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In this example, the equilibrium interdiction strategy targets edges (s, 1) and (2, t) that do not belong to a same cut set. Thus, Theorem 3 generalizes the previously studied max-flow min-cut-based metrics of network criticality (see Assadi et al [2], Dwivedi and Yu [11], Gueye et al [13]).…”

Section: Let Us Assume Thatsupporting

confidence: 77%

“…Dwivedi and Yu [11], Gueye et al [13]). However, these objects cannot be applied to describe the critical network components in our game due to the heterogeneity of path interdiction probabilities resulting from the transportation costs.…”

Section: Gueye and Marbukhmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Our work is also motivated by previous problems studied in network security games (e.g. Baykal-Gürsoy et al [7], Gueye et al [13], Szeto [26]). However, the available results in this line of work are for simpler cases, and do not apply to our model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games

Dahan,

Amin,

Jaillet

2018

Preprint

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We consider the following problem: Does there exist a probability distribution over subsets of a finite partially ordered set (poset), such that a set of constraints involving marginal probabilities of the poset's elements and maximal chains is satisfied? In this article, we present a combinatorial algorithm to positively resolve this question. We show that this result plays a crucial role in the equilibrium analysis of a generic security game on a capacitated flow network. The game involves a routing entity that sends its flow through the network while facing path transportation costs, and an interdictor who simultaneously interdicts one or more edges while facing edge interdiction costs. The first (resp. second) player seeks to maximize the value of effective (resp. interdicted) flow net the total transportation (resp. interdiction) cost. Using our existence result on posets and strict complementary slackness in linear programming, we show that the equilibrium properties of this game can be described using primal and dual solutions of a minimum cost circulation problem. Our analysis provides a new characterization of the critical network components.

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Section: Let Us Assume Thatsupporting

confidence: 77%

Section: Gueye and Marbukhmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games

Dahan,

Amin,

Jaillet

2018

Preprint

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“…For example, the authors in [6], [7] assume that the attack signal would follow certain probabilistic distributions and then design filters for detection of such attacks. In [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], the authors use the game theory framework, where the controller and attacker are players with competing goals in a game. Attackers are assumed to adopt specific strategies that maximize a certain cost and the controller or estimator is designed to minimize such a cost.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure Estimation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles against Adversarial Cyber Attacks

Hu,

Chang,

Tomlin

2016

Preprint

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In the coming years, usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is expected to grow tremendously. Maintaining security of UAVs under cyber attacks is an important yet challenging task, as these attacks are often erratic and difficult to predict. Secure estimation problems study how to estimate the states of a dynamical system from a set of noisy and maliciously corrupted sensor measurements. The fewer assumptions that an estimator makes about the attacker, the larger the set of attacks it can protect the system against. In this paper, we focus on sensor attacks on UAVs and attempt to design a secure estimator for linear time-invariant systems based on as few assumptions about the attackers as possible. We propose a computationally efficient estimator that protects the system against arbitrary and unbounded attacks, where the set of attacked sensors can also change over time. In addition, we propose to combine our secure estimator with a Kalman Filter for improved practical performance and demonstrate its effectiveness through simulations of two scenarios where an UAV is under adversarial cyber attack.

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“…A referee has drawn our attention to a paper byGueye and Marbukh (2012) who study a game in which the Designer picks a spanning tree from a network while an Adversary picks a link to delete. The aim of the Adversary is to maximize the loss to the Designer.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks

Goyal

Vigier

2014

The Review of Economic Studies

101

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Connections between individuals facilitate the exchange of goods, resources and information and create benefits. These connections may be exploited by adversaries to spread their attacks as well. What is the optimal way to design and defend networks in the face of attacks?We develop a model with a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer moves first and chooses a network and an allocation of defense resources across nodes. The Adversary then allocates attack resources on nodes; if an attack succeeds then the Adversary decides on how successful resources should navigate the network.We obtain two principal results. One, we show that in a wide variety of circumstances a star network with all defence resources allocated to the central node is optimal for the Designer. Two, we identify conditions on the technology of conflict, network value function and the resource configuration for which networks with multiple hubs/components are optimal.

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Towards a Metric for Communication Network Vulnerability to Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Cited by 21 publications

References 6 publications

Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games

Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games

Secure Estimation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles against Adversarial Cyber Attacks

Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks

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