Towards a Model-Based Evolutionary Chain of Evidence for Compliance with Safety Standards

Nair, Sunil; Verhulst, Eric; Studzizba, Janusz; Pepek, Piotr; Lambourg, Jerome; Sabetzadeh, Mehrdad

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33675-1_6

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Possible consequences of a change can be the need for adding, modifying, or revoking safety evidence artefacts. Changes during system development, system modification and re-certification, and component reuse are examples of situations in which SECIA can be necessary [12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Industrial Survey of Safety Evidence Change Impact Analysis Practice

Vara

Borg

Wnuk

et al. 2016

IIEEE Trans. Software Eng.

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Abstract-Context. In many application domains, critical systems must comply with safety standards. This involves gathering safety evidence in the form of artefacts such as safety analyses, system specifications, and testing results. These artefacts can evolve during a system's lifecycle, creating a need for change impact analysis to guarantee that system safety and compliance are not jeopardised. Objective. We aim to provide new insights into how safety evidence change impact analysis is addressed in practice. The knowledge about this activity is limited despite the extensive research that has been conducted on change impact analysis and on safety evidence management. Method. We conducted an industrial survey on the circumstances under which safety evidence change impact analysis is addressed, the tool support used, and the challenges faced. Results. We obtained 97 valid responses representing 16 application domains, 28 countries, and 47 safety standards. The respondents had most often performed safety evidence change impact analysis during system development, from system specifications, and fully manually. No commercial change impact analysis tool was reported as used for all artefact types and insufficient tool support was the most frequent challenge. Conclusion. The results suggest that the different artefact types used as safety evidence co-evolve. In addition, the evolution of safety cases should probably be better managed, the level of automation in safety evidence change impact analysis is low, and the state of the practice can benefit from over 20 improvement areas.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Industrial Survey of Safety Evidence Change Impact Analysis Practice

Vara

Borg

Wnuk

et al. 2016

IIEEE Trans. Software Eng.

Self Cite

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“…We also recommended carefully analysing SACM before deciding to use it as basis for another metamodel, and indicated that the notion of evidence in SACM might be unclear. Other publications have indicated the potential relationship of SACM with their proposals for safety evidence lifecycle [23], for characterising safety evidence assessment [24], and for characterising safety evidence in general [25,26]. Nair et al [5] indicate that SACM does not provide a thorough and sufficiently detailed analysis of the possible evidence types to provide for safety certification and of how to structure and assess evidence.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An analysis of safety evidence management with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

Génova

Álvarez-Rodríguez

Lloréns

2017

Computer Standards & Interfaces

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“…Hence a component certified to one standard or set of standards may have to be re-certified to another. There exist also other specific needs when a system evolves [5], such as managing evidence change impact. We propose the RAF metamodel in order to aid compliance in these various scenarios.!…”

Section: Metamodel For Reference Assurance Framework!mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…! Demonstration of compliance with safety standards becomes even more difficult when a system changes [5]. For example, evidence evolves when a system aims to be certified against different safety standards or reused in another application domain.…”

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confidence: 99%

Model-based specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems: A holistic generic metamodel

Ruíz

Attwood

Espinoza

et al. 2016

Information and Software Technology

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eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version -refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website. TakedownIf you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. Model-Based Specification of Safety Compliance Needs for CriticalSystems: A Holistic Generic Metamodel! Abstract!Context: Many critical systems must comply with safety standards as a way of providing assurance that they do not pose undue risks to people, property, or the environment. Safety compliance is a very demanding activity, as the standards can consist of hundreds of pages and practitioners typically have to show the fulfilment of thousands of safety-related criteria. Furthermore, the text of the standards can be ambiguous, inconsistent, and hard to understand, making it difficult to determine how to effectively structure and manage safety compliance information. These issues become even more challenging when a system is intended to be reused in another application domain with different applicable standards.Objective: This paper aims to resolve these issues by providing a metamodel for the specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems. Method: The metamodel is holistic and generic, and abstracts common concepts for demonstrating safety compliance from different standards and application domains. Its application results in the specification of Òreference assurance frameworksÓ for safety-critical systems, which correspond to a model of the safety criteria of a given standard. For validating the metamodel with safety standards, parts of several standards have been modelled by both academic and industry personnel, and other standards have been analysed. We further augment this with feedback from practitioners, including feedback during a workshop. Results:The results from the validation show that the metamodel can be used to specify safety compliance needs for aerospace, automotive, avionics, defence, healthcare, machinery, maritime, oil and gas, process industry, railway, and robotics. Practitioners consider that the metamodel can meet their needs and find benefits in its use. Conclusion:The metamodel supports the specification of safety compliance needs for most critical computer-based and software-intensive systems. The resulting models can provide an effective means of structuring and managing safety compliance infor...

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Towards a Model-Based Evolutionary Chain of Evidence for Compliance with Safety Standards

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

An Industrial Survey of Safety Evidence Change Impact Analysis Practice

An Industrial Survey of Safety Evidence Change Impact Analysis Practice

An analysis of safety evidence management with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

Model-based specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems: A holistic generic metamodel

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