Towards a Political Economy of Weak Institutions and Strong Elites in Central America

Abstract

A common conclusion of studies on Central America's democracies and political economy is that the weakness of institutions and the strength of elites are a main reason for the region's problems. Recently, a set of studies have attempted to scrutinize these elites in detail, focussing on their strategies and resources. The purpose of this article is to reflect upon what these studies can tell us about the question: what is strong when institutions are weak? I argue that in the Northern Triangle particularly the answer is elite networks and their command over and competition for the control over four sets of resources: money, means of force, information, and ideas and ideologies, including religion. A systematic study of such networks and how they interact with formal institutions may give us a more realistic view of the current state of Central American political economies. Keywords: Central America, institutions, political economy, elites, networks.Resumen: Hacia una economía política de instituciones débiles y élites fuertes en Centroamérica Una conclusión común a la que llegan los estudios sobre la economía política y las democracias centroamericanas es que la debilidad de las instituciones y la fuerza de las élites son una razón fundamental para los problemas de la región. Últimamente, una serie de estudios han intentado estudiar a fondo dichas élites, enfocándose en sus estrategias y recursos. El objetivo del presente artículo es reflexionar sobre lo que dichos estudios pueden aportarnos a la respuesta de la pregunta: ¿qué es fuerte cuando las instituciones son débiles? Yo sostengo que en el Triángulo Norte, en particular, la respuesta son las redes de las élites y su control, así como su competencia por dicho control, de cuatro categorías de recursos: el dinero, los medios de coacción, la información y las ideas e ideologías, incluida la religión. Un estudio sistemático de dichas redes y sobre cómo interactúan con las instituciones formales podría facilitarnos una visión más realista del estado actual de las economías políticas centroamericanas. Palabras clave: Centroamérica, instituciones, economía política, élites, redes.

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