Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths

Abstract

Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think that this is a congenital defect of orthodox modal epistemology. This way of characterising modal epistemology is however optional. It is shown that one can non-circularly characterise modal conditions on knowledge in terms of epistemic possibilities, or ways the world might be for the target agent. Characterising the anti-luck condition in terms of epistemic possibilities removes the impediment to understanding epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths and opens the door to using these conditions to shed new light on some longstanding epistemological problems.

Of Marriage and Mathematics: Inferentialism and Social Ontology

“…See Stirton (2016) for critical discussion. Regarding arithmetical truths as stipulated in this way plausibly circumvents the kind of epistemic worries regarding mathematical platonism discussed by Benacerraf (1973), Field (1989a), and Collin (2018.…”

Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety

“…According to Pritchard's solution, the set of propositions is constrained by the basis of the belief. We should only consider beliefs that are formed on the same basis while beliefs formed on a different basis 7 For similar arguments, see Becker (2007), Blome-Tillmann (2017), Collin (2018), Dietz and Hawthorne (forthcoming), Hales (2016), Levy (2011), Melchior (2017Melchior ( , 2021, Miščević (2007), Zhao (2021, forthcoming). Bernecker (2011), Broncano-Berrocal (2019, Freitag (2014), Greco (2016), Hiller and Neta (2007), Hirvelä (2017Hirvelä ( , 2019, Kripke (2011), Paterson (2020), Stone (2013), and Zhao (2021) also argue that in addition to necessary truths, modally robust contingent truths, which are true in all nearby possible worlds, incur the same problem for SAFETY.…”

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

“…For similar arguments, seeBecker (2007),Blome-Tillmann (2017),Collin (2018),Melchior (2017Melchior ( , 2021,Miščević (2007), andRoland and Cogburn (2011) Bernecker (2011), Broncano-Berrocal (2019,Freitag (2014),Greco (2016),Hiller and Neta (2007),Hirvelä (2019),Kripke (2011), Paterson (2020), and Stone (2013. also argue that in addition to necessary truths, modally robust contingent truths which are true in all nearby possible worlds cause the same problem for SAFETY.…”