Towards an Anonymous Incident Communication Channel for Electric Smart Grids

Triantafyllou, Anna; Sarigiannidis, Panagiotis; Sarigiannidis, Antonios; Rios, Erkuden; Iturbe, Eider; Ltd, Limassol idroco Holdings

doi:10.32010/26166127.2019.2.1.7.28

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The organizations and companies must be better prepared to respond and recover from novel cyber-attacks, as adversaries are constantly developing and experimenting with different types of malware. An exemplary countermeasure is presented in [196]. The authors developed an anonymous incident communication channel, that enables Smart Grid operators to cooperatively exchange cyber attack details and patterns.…”

Section: F Scada Cyber Hygienementioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on SCADA Systems: Secure Protocols, Incidents, Threats and Tactics

Pliatsios

Sarigiannidis

Λάγκας

et al. 2020

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

Self Cite

201

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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are the underlying monitoring and control components of critical infrastructures, such as power, telecommunication, transportation, pipelines, chemicals and manufacturing plants. Legacy SCADA systems operated on isolated networks, that made them less exposed to Internet threats. However, the increasing connection of SCADA systems to the Internet, as well as corporate networks, introduces severe security issues. Security considerations for SCADA systems are gaining higher attention, as the number of security incidents against these critical infrastructures is increasing. In this survey, we provide an overview of the general SCADA architecture, along with a detailed description of the SCADA communication protocols. Additionally, we discuss certain high-impact security incidents, objectives, and threats. Furthermore, we carry out an extensive review of the security proposals and tactics that aim to secure SCADA systems. We also discuss the state of SCADA system security. Finally, we present the current research trends and future advancements of SCADA security.

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Section: F Scada Cyber Hygienementioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on SCADA Systems: Secure Protocols, Incidents, Threats and Tactics

Pliatsios

Sarigiannidis

Λάγκας

et al. 2020

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

Self Cite

201

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…In [17], A. Triantafyllou et al present the requirements of an anonymous repository of incidents exclusively related to SG. In the same study, similar information-sharing paradigms, such as the Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) are discussed, while proposed technologies are also proposed.…”

Section: Information Sharing and Anonymous Repository Of Incidentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure and Private Smart Grid: The SPEAR Architecture

Radoglou-Grammatikis

Sarigiannidis

Iturbe

et al. 2020

2020 6th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft)

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Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is an integral part of Critical Infrastructures (CIs), bringing both significant pros and cons. Focusing our attention on the energy sector, ICT converts the conventional electrical grid into a new paradigm called Smart Grid (SG), providing crucial benefits such as pervasive control, better utilisation of the existing resources, self-healing, etc. However, in parallel, ICT increases the attack surface of this domain, generating new potential cyberthreats. In this paper, we present the Secure and PrivatE smArt gRid (SPEAR) architecture which constitutes an overall solution aiming at protecting SG, by enhancing situational awareness, detecting timely cyberattacks, collecting appropriate forensic evidence and providing an anonymous cybersecurity information-sharing mechanism. Operational characteristics and technical specifications details are analysed for each component, while also the communication interfaces among them are described in detail.

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“…However, this new method results in additional communication overhead when increasing the number of collaborating smart meters. Nevertheless, the most common drawback of anonymization techniques is being sensitive to the background knowledge attack [87]. Since it is not possible to predict the level of background knowledge an attacker possesses about an individual, compromise has to be made with a higher distortion to the data and consequently higher information loss [88].…”

Section: Smart Meter3mentioning

confidence: 99%