Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 1 (Neurobiological and cognitive models)

Abstract

The study of consciousness is poised today at interesting crossroads. There has been a surge of research into various neurobiological underpinnings of consciousness in the past decade. The present article looks at the theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially the ones that neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology have to offer. We will first discuss the origin and etymology of word consciousness and its usage. Neurobiological correlates of consciousness are discussed with structures like the ascending reticular activating system, the amygdala, the cerebellum, the thalamus, the frontoparietal circuits, the prefrontal cortex and the precuneus. The cellular and microlevel theories of consciousness and cerebral activity at the neuronal level contributing to consciousness are highlighted, along with the various theories posited in this area. The role of neuronal assemblies and circuits along with firing patterns and their ramifications for the understanding of consciousness are discussed. A section on the role of anaesthesia and its links to consciousness is presented, along with details of split-brain studies in consciousness and altered states of awareness, including the vegetative states. The article finally discusses the progress cognitive psychology has made in identifying and theorising various perspectives of consciousness, perceptual awareness and conscious processing. Both recent and past researches are highlighted. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with the pitfalls, if present. A need for integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed, to enable one to reach a theory that explains the ultimate neurobiology of consciousness.

The Elephant in the Mirror: Bridging the Brain's Explanatory Gap of Consciousness

“…Many people view an in-depth exploration into consciousness and its emergence as a gamble, considering decades already spent on the matter with a void of consensus (Dennett, 1991; Jibu and Yasue, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1996; Stapp, 2001; Crick and Koch, 2003; Tononi, 2008; De Sousa, 2013; Seager, 2016). Before we attempt to create another hypothesis, our approach needs to change; it's our suggestion to further refine the constructs and emergence of SA and to use brain augmentation as an instrument for inspection.…”

Neurobiology of Consciousness: Current Research and Perspectives

“…Most researchers are impervious to the problem, focusing solely on the proper experimental techniques and data analysis. It is still a unique attitude, but the need to integrate various perspectives has been recognized and attempts of more philosophical approach have been made by some authors in recent years [39], [40], [52], [86], [92]. Is it possible to conclude that scientific data unambiguously justify reductionism?…”

A Commentary on De Sousa′s "Towards an Integrative Theory of Consciousness"

“…I comment on the sections of De Sousa's critical reviews (De Sousa 2013a[9], 2013b[10]), highlighting the main contributions and limitations of the reviewed literature. I jump only a couple of sections, because they are not central for the project of theoretical integration.…”

“…Based on this premise, or just for the progress of empirical knowledge, several authors have investigated conscious functions related to the reticular activating region, amygdala, insula, thalamus, precuneus, parietal and/or prefrontal cortex, as reviewed by De Sousa (2013a[9]).…”