Towards an IT Security Protection Profile for Safety-Related Communication in Railway Automation

Bock, Hans‐Hermann; Braband, Jens; Milius, Birgit; Schäbe, Hendrik

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33678-2_12

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…t.manipulation may be considered to be a particular threat leading to unauthorized access and is very similar to the masquerade threat from EN 50159. More details can be found in [1,13].…”

Section: Comparison Of Threats Between En 50159 / En 50129 and Commonmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the relationship of hazards and threats in railway signaling

Braband

Seemann

2012

7th IET International Conference on System Safety, Incorporating the Cyber Security Conference 2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper discusses the relationship of hazards and threats in railway-related safety and security standards. It points out similarities but also gaps and proposes improvements. It is shown that, in particular, the approaches to risk analyses and the definition of safety and security differ substantially so that these processes should be treated separately. The general goal should be the separation of safety and security concerns as far as possible, which might help in the integration and maintainability of safety and security certificates. A particular goal could be to use certified COTS security components also in the railway signaling domain, instead of creating a new certification framework.

show abstract

“…t.manipulation may be considered to be a particular threat leading to unauthorized access and is very similar to the masquerade threat from EN 50159. More details can be found in [1,13].…”

Section: Comparison Of Threats Between En 50159 / En 50129 and Commonmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the relationship of hazards and threats in railway signaling

Braband

Seemann

2012

7th IET International Conference on System Safety, Incorporating the Cyber Security Conference 2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore, IT security requirements for railway automation is needed. Bock et al [11] discussed this issue and represented the CC-based IT security requirements for the railway domain as a protection profile. They also developed a reference architecture to distinguish IT security and safety requirements and discussed security objectives and threats in this application domain.…”

Section: Protection Profile In Railway Automationmentioning

confidence: 99%

System Security Assurance: A Systematic Literature Review

Shukla¹,

Katt²,

Nweke³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Security assurance provides the confidence that security features, practices, procedures, and architecture of software systems mediate and enforce the security policy and are resilient against security failure and attacks. Alongside the significant benefits of security assurance, the evolution of new information and communication technology (ICT) introduces new challenges regarding information protection. Security assurance methods based on the traditional tools, techniques, and procedures may fail to account new challenges due to poor requirement specifications, static nature, and poor development processes. The common criteria (CC) commonly used for security evaluation and certification process also comes with many limitations and challenges. In this paper, extensive efforts have been made to study the state-of-the-art, limitations and future research directions for security assurance of the ICT and cyber-physical systems (CPS) in a wide range of domains. We systematically review the requirements, processes, and activities involved in system security assurance including security requirements, security metrics, system and environments and assurance methods. We shed light on the challenges and gaps that have been identified by the existing literature related to system security assurance and corresponding solutions. Finally, we discussed the limitations of the present methods and future research directions.CCS Concepts: • General and reference → Surveys and overviews; • Security and privacy → Systems security.

show abstract

“…They do not scale to a one-affects-all attack, because each field element has to be attacked individually. Also it is considered virtually impossible to protect against such physical attacks in a large-scale infrastructure like nationwide railway signalling [6,7]. For this reason, only protection against high-impact one-affects-all attacks is the main scope of this paper.…”

Section: Attacker Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks

Heinrich

Vateva-Gurova

Arul

et al. 2019

Security and Communication Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Securing a safety-critical system is a challenging task, because safety requirements have to be considered alongside security controls. We report on our experience to develop a security architecture for railway signalling systems starting from the bare safety-critical system that requires protection. We use a threat-based approach to determine security risk acceptance criteria and derive security requirements. We discuss the executed process and make suggestions for improvements. Based on the security requirements, we develop a security architecture. The architecture is based on a hardware platform that provides the resources required for safety as well as security applications and is able to run these applications of mixed-criticality (safety-critical applications and other applications run on the same device). To achieve this, we apply the MILS approach, a separation-based high-assurance security architecture to simplify the safety case and security case of our approach. We describe the assurance requirements of the separation kernel subcomponent, which represents the key component of the MILS architecture. We further discuss the security measures of our architecture that are included to protect the safety-critical application from cyberattacks.

show abstract

Towards an IT Security Protection Profile for Safety-Related Communication in Railway Automation

Cited by 9 publications

References 2 publications

On the relationship of hazards and threats in railway signaling

On the relationship of hazards and threats in railway signaling

System Security Assurance: A Systematic Literature Review

Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About