Towards an Updatable Strategy Logic

Chareton, Christophe; Brunel, Julien; Chemouil, David

doi:10.4204/eptcs.112.14

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The actual dependence expressed in Formula (8) asserts that the whole set of possible variations of x induces some changes on y. However it would be interesting to give finer means to characterise the variations of x due to those of y.…”

Section: Strong Dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

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A logic with revocable and refinable strategies

Chareton¹,

Brunel²,

Chemouil³

2015

Information and Computation

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In this article, we present Updatable Strategy Logic (USL), a multi-agent temporal logic which subsumes the main propositions in this area, such as ATL, ATL*, ATL sc and SL. These logics allow to express the capabilities of agents to ensure the satisfaction of temporal properties. USL mainly differs from SL, in two ways. Semantically, USL relies on multistrategies (that is, non-deterministic strategies), and the notion of strategy composition is extended to enable an agent to refine her strategy, that is to update it without revoking it. Syntactically, the logic features a binding operator enabling multi-strategy refinements as well as an "unbinding" operator that allows an agent to explicitly revoke a multi-strategy (whereas revocation is implicit with the binding operator in SL). We show that USL allows to express a notion of sustainable control for an agent, i.e., a capability to always decide the satisfaction of a property, that still holds even after the said capability has been employed. Furthermore, USL allows the definition of a notion of equality between multi-strategies that enables to consider quantification over deterministic strategies. This makes USL strictly more expressive than SL. Finally, we also show that the model-checking problem for USL is decidable but non-elementary (as for SL).

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Section: Strong Dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, building on previous work introduced in [8], we present Updatable Strategy Logic (USL), a logic allowing to consider strategies that are updatable, i.e. refinable or revocable explicitly.…”

Section: Explicit Strategy Unbindingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A logic with revocable and refinable strategies

Chareton¹,

Brunel²,

Chemouil³

2015

Information and Computation

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“…To achieve this, a logic that allows to reason about the ability of agents to ensure temporal properties is required. This is the aim of temporal multi-agent logics, such as ATL [AHK02], Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman's Strategy Logic (SL) [CHP10] or USL (Updatable Strategy Logic) [CBC13,CBC15], which is strictly more expressive than the former two, and which we originally proposed to address such issues.…”

Section: Formal Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the Assignment of Behavioral Goals to Coalitions of Agents

Chareton

Brunel²,

Chemouil³

2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We present a formal framework for solving what we call the "assignment problem": given a set of behavioral goals for a system and a set of agents described by their capabilities to make the system evolve, the problem is to find a "good" assignment of goals to (coalitions of) agents. To do so, we define Kore, a core modelling framework as well as its semantics in terms of a strategy logic called USL. In Kore, agents are defined by their capabilities, which are pre-and post-conditions on the system variables, and goals are defined in terms of temporal logic formulas. Then, an assignment associates each goal with the coalition of agents that is responsible for its satisfaction. Our problem consists in defining and checking the correctness of this assignment. We define different criteria for modelling and formalizing this notion of correctness. They reduce to the satisfaction of USL formulas in a structure derived from the capabilities of agents. Thus, we end up with a procedure for deciding the correctness of the assignment. We illustrate our approach using a toy example featuring exchanges of resources between a provider and two clients.

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“…updating strategy logic (U-SL) has been considered in Chareton et al [2013] where, in addition to SL, an agent can refine its own strategies by means of an "unbinder" operator, which explicitly deletes the binding of a strategy to an agent. In Belardinelli [2014], an epistemic extension of SL with modal operators for individual knowledge has been considered, showing that the complexity of model checking for this logic is not worse than the one for (nonepistemic) SL.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning About Strategies

Mogavero

Murano

Perelli

et al. 2014

ACM Trans. Comput. Logic

138

155

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In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the environment behaves. An important contribution in this context is given by modal logics for strategic ability, in the setting of multiagent games, such as ATL, ATL * , and the like. Recently, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman introduced Strategy Logic, which we denote here by CHP-SL, with the aim of getting a powerful framework for reasoning explicitly about strategies. CHP-SL is obtained by using first-order quantifications over strategies and has been investigated in the very specific setting of two-agents turned-based games, where a nonelementary model-checking algorithm has been provided. While CHP-SL is a very expressive logic, we claim that it does not fully capture the strategic aspects of multiagent systems.In this article, we introduce and study a more general strategy logic, denoted SL, for reasoning about strategies in multiagent concurrent games. As a key aspect, strategies in SL are not intrinsically glued to a specific agent, but an explicit binding operator allows an agent to bind to a strategy variable. This allows agents to share strategies or reuse one previously adopted. We prove that SL strictly includes CHP-SL, while maintaining a decidable model-checking problem. In particular, the algorithm we propose is computationally not harder than the best one known for CHP-SL. Moreover, we prove that such a problem for SL is NONELEMENTARY. This negative result has spurred us to investigate syntactic fragments of SL, strictly subsuming ATL * , with the hope of obtaining an elementary model-checking problem. Among others, we introduce and study the sublogics SL [NG], SL [BG], and SL[1G]. They encompass formulas in a special prenex normal form having, respectively, nested temporal goals, Boolean combinations of goals, and, a single goal at a time. Intuitively, for a goal, we mean a sequence of bindings, one for each agent, followed by an LTL formula. We prove that the model-checking problem for SL[1G] is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, thus not harder than the one for ATL * . In contrast, SL[NG] turns out to be NONELEMENTARY-HARD, strengthening the corresponding result for SL. Regarding SL[BG], we show that it includes CHP-SL and its model-checking is decidable with a 2EXPTIMElower-bound.It is worth enlightening that to achieve the positive results about SL[1G], we introduce a fundamental property of the semantics of this logic, called behavioral, which allows to strongly simplify the reasoning about strategies. Indeed, in a nonbehavioral logic such as SL [BG] and the subsuming ones, to satisfy a formula, one has to take into account that a move of an agent, at a given moment of a play, may depend on the moves taken by any agent in another counterfactual play.

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Towards an Updatable Strategy Logic

Cited by 6 publications

References 8 publications

A logic with revocable and refinable strategies

A logic with revocable and refinable strategies

Evaluating the Assignment of Behavioral Goals to Coalitions of Agents

Reasoning About Strategies

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