Towards fake sources for source location privacy in wireless sensor networks with multiple sources

Abstract

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Achieving Source Location Privacy Protection in Monitoring Wireless Sensor Networks through Proxy Node Routing

“…Strength of an adversary can be factored along two dimensions: presence and actions [ 1 , 3 ]. Presence is concerned with network coverage of the adversary while action is concerned with type of attacks it can launch.…”

“…The use of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in monitoring applications can vary from safety-critical monitoring applications such as monitoring of high value assets, the military, healthcare and radiation monitoring, to non-critical applications such as temperature and humidity control [ 1 ]. In safety-critical monitoring applications, it is extremely important to ensure that transmission of data between the sensor nodes is secure and information such as location of the asset being monitored is kept private [ 2 , 3 ]. WSNs operate in broadcast mode and packets are routed from the source node to sink node through multi-hop communication.…”

Strategic Location-Based Random Routing for Source Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks

“…The adopted adversary model may be considered relatively weak compared to other powerful adversary models as highlighted in [16]. Nonetheless, the proposed model is preferred since some of the more powerful models include behaviors that are unlikely for the adversary to perform, as it will affect its ability to get further information from the network.…”

“…If the safety period is exceeded, it is possible that the asset will have moved to a different location. A set of actions that a more powerful adversary can perform but with limited benefits to the adversary are expressed in [16] in the following order: …”

“…Two notions for the parameter safety period are given in [16]. The first notion defines the safety period as the time required for an adversary to back trace and capture the asset.…”